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ABSTRACT
Web 2.0 has been growing rapidly in the past decade, and leading to surging
popularity of online social media. There are over 2.1 billion people that are using
social media, which is 28% of the global population. Social media has become one
of the most complex computing and communication systems in the planet. Social
media attracts large amount of people to create, share and exchange information,
interests, ideas, pictures, videos, and etc. in the virtual communities. In social
media, people can interact with acquaintances and strangers, and thus privacy and
security should be considered seriously.
From the privacy perspective, one of the severe type of privacy breach is re-
lated to online social networks, such as Facebook, Linkedin, Google+, and Twitter.
Online social network users are often not aware of the size and the nature of the
audience viewing their profiles, and therefore they may reveal more information
than what is appropriate to be viewed publicly. Due to the lack of privacy aware-
ness, online social network users can suffer a number of privacy related threats. In
this dissertation, a quantitative online social network privacy risk analysis frame-
work – TAPE is proposed. Inspired by the reliability analysis of a wireless sensor
network, the binary decision diagram tool is employed to calculate online social
network privacy level. The privacy awareness and privacy trust metrics are pro-
posed to evaluate online social network users’ intention of privacy protection. To
our best knowledge, TAPE framework is the first work that take both privacy
awareness and privacy trust into consideration. Based on the TAPE framework,
we also propose an unfriending strategy in terms of privacy protection, which out-
performs other existing unfriending strategies. The detail of this framework is
introduced in Chapter 2.
From the security perspective, online product/service review system is one
of the most vulnerable systems in social media. Since there are enormous prof-
its of online markets and the customers’ purchasing decision is relying on the
product/service review, it is highly possible that firms and retailers at the online
marketplace may create fake reviews to mislead customers. In this dissertation,
a novel angle of fake review detection is introduced, which is called Equal Rating
Opportunity (ERO) principle. Based on ERO principle, ERO analysis is proposed.
ERO analysis can be implemented with limited cost. It is a new direction of fake
review detection. Based on real data testing, ERO analysis is able detect new
perspectives of fake review, which cannot be detected by other approaches, while
giving a relatively low false alarm rate. The ERO principle and ERO analysis is
presented in Chapter 3.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is organized in the manuscript format. Particularly, there are
three chapters. The introduction is given in Chapter 1, followed by two manuscripts
discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. A brief introduction of the manuscripts are
as follows.
• Manuscript 1 in Chapter 2:
Yongbo Zeng, Yan (Lindsay) Sun, Liudong Xing, and Vinod Vokkarane,
“Online Social Networks Privacy Study Through TAPE Framework”, IEEE
Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 2015, in press
• Manuscript 2 in Chapter 3:
Yongbo Zeng, Yihai Zhu, and Yan (Lindsay) Sun, “Equal Rating Opportu-
nity Analysis for Detecting Review Manipulation”, in preparing for submis-
sion to IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. An earlier
and shorter version is published in the IEEE China Summit and International
Conference on Signal and Information Processing (ChinaSIP 2015)
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the past decade, there was a dramatic rise in popularity of online social
media, such as micro-blogs, online social networks, online product/service review
systems, crowdfunding, video sharing, photo sharing, business network, social gam-
ing, and etc. It is reported that by January 2015, there are over 3 billion active
Internet users, around 2.1 billion people have active social media accounts, and
the population of social media is still growing [1]. Social media has become one of
the most complex computing and communication system on the planet. Just like
any modern computing and communication systems, security and privacy are the
primary concerns.
From the privacy perspective, one of the severe types of privacy breach is re-
lated to online social networks (OSNs). Facebook, Linkedin, Google+, and Twitter
are some of the most visited OSNs. According to the report by Kemp, Facebook
has 1.4 billion users and 4.5 billion daily likes, Twitter has 284 million users and
500 million daily tweets, and Google+ has 363 million users and 5 billion daily
clicks of +1 button1 [1]. OSN users are often not aware of the size and the na-
ture of the audience viewing their profiles, and therefore they may reveal more
information than what is appropriate to be viewed publicly. For example, 72%
of teens have a social networking profile and nearly half (47%) of them have a
public profile accessible by anyone [2]. 15% of Americans have never checked their
social networking privacy and security account settings [3]. As a result of lack of
privacy awareness, OSNs may often generate a number of privacy related threats
for the users. It is reported that the top two social media sites that stalkers use
1Google+’s +1 button is similar to the like button of Facebook. Users can click the +1 button
to show that they like or agree with something, such as photos, videos and news.
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are Facebook (16%) and Twitter (3%) [4]. In this dissertation, a quantitative pri-
vacy risk analysis framework is proposed. This framework can be used to educate
OSN users and raise their privacy protection awareness. It is also able to provide
recommendations to improve OSN users’ privacy level thus reducing privacy risks.
From the security perspective, online product/service review system is one of
the most vulnerable systems in social media. First, online product/service has a
huge market and it is still growing. More than 80% of the Internet users have
used the Internet to make a purchase, and more than 50% of the online shoppers
shopped online more than once [5]. E-commerce sales in the US are predicted
to grow from $263 billion in 2013 to $414 billion in 2018 [6]. Second, online
product/service review plays a critical role in online market. There are 74% of
consumers that relying on social media to guide their purchases [7]. A one-star
rating increase can bring a 5-9% increase of revenue to online sellers [8]. Since
there are huge profits of online markets and the purchasing decisions dramatically
depend on the product/service reviews, it is highly possible that firms and retailers
at the online marketplace may create fake reviews to mislead online customers. In
this dissertation, a new angle of fake review detection is introduced. The fake
review detection approach based on the new angle can capture dishonest signals
that the existing approaches would miss. The success of ERO analysis can improve
the trustworthiness of product reviews, can help customers make better decisions,
can suppress the fake review market, and therefore can help us build a healthy
competitive online market.
1.1 Online Social Network Privacy
1.1.1 Privacy Threats
As the OSNs emerge, people are facing new critical privacy issues. People
participate OSN activities by sharing personal data, such as photos, videos, travel
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plans, comments, etc. The casual posting of personal information on an OSN often
creates a permanent record of the user’s personal data, and it creates the possibility
for the information to be propagated through social network connections. Some
information is expected to be accessible only to certain people, usually intimates
or acquaintances. However, ONS is a scale-free network, and digital data is easy
to copy and store. Therefore, there are unexpected viewers that may obtain our
personal data, and sometimes even private information. This can lead to personal
information abuse and affect our daily life.
Real life stories of sensitive information leakage via OSN happen frequently.
For example, the UK Ministry of Defence staff have leaked confidential information
onto social network sites 6 times in 18 months [9]. The Israeli military cancelled a
planned raid on a Palestinian village after one of its soldiers posted details of the
operation on Facebook [10]. More employers begin to collect potential employees’
information using social network. According to a survey released on the EU Data
Protection Day [11], information leakage has put people’s careers on risk.
1.1.2 Privacy Protection
ONS privacy issue has been attracting public attention. Hasib has categorized
the OSN privacy threats into several types [12], such as digital dossier and search
engine indexing that makes sensitive information searchable, image retrieval and
interpretation, and profile association. Krishnamurthy et al. studied the problem
of personally identity information leakage and how it can be misused by third-
parties [13].Livingstone [14] discussed the risks when young people make friends
and share personal information to express themselves online.
Solutions are proposed from different perspectives to protect privacy. On-
line social network service providers, including Facebook and Google+, let users
manage who can access a certain type of information, and Linkedin hides sensi-
3
tive information from users that are not connected to the user. Researchers also
studied privacy protection from several perspectives. The first type is proposing
new structure of online social network. Felt et al. [15] studied and discussed the
privacy concerns of social network APIs (application programming interface) for
third party. Baden et al. [16] proposed a new type of online social network using
encryption to hide user data and allowing user to define privacy policies. Guha et
al. [17] proposed an approach to hide user data by mapping real data to fake data.
Another type is developing tools or methods to examine and improve current on-
line social network privacy. Fang et al. [18] developed privacy wizards to give user
recommendation for privacy setting. Gundecha et al. [19] proposed an approach to
identify a user’s vulnerable friends. In this dissertation, I propose to assist users to
improve privacy from another perspective, that is, measuring privacy risk by con-
sidering both whether related users are aware of privacy protection and whether
they are trusted to protect others’ personal information.
1.1.3 Quantitative Privacy Risk Analysis
According to [20], general security threats can be divided into avoidable cate-
gory and unavoidable category. OSN privacy issue, in the current design of OSN,
is unavoidable, due to the publicity of OSN [21]. When risk is unavoidable, we
assume an existing risk and attempt to reduce the likelihood of harmful events.
Under the assumption of unavoidable risk, risk analysis becomes extremely
important. With an effective risk analysis method, we are able to 1) design secure
privacy management, 2) monitor critical data and protect them effectively, 3)
make effective privacy policies, and 4) provide valuable analysis data for future
estimation [22].
Risk analysis can be performed either quantitatively or qualitatively. Accord-
ing to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), risk analysis
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is defined as “the process of identifying risk, assessing risk, and taking steps to
reduce risk to an acceptable level” [23]. From this guideline, quantitative risk
analysis plays a critical role as the reduction of risk need to be measured. The
advantages of quantitative risk analysis include [24]:
• Many metrics can be used to represent and evaluate the risk parameters.
This allows a more detailed analysis of the risky events.
• The risk parameters can be expressed in a numerical way, by which people
can understand them and make comparison (e.g. human defined units for
data importance, threat impact and reputation loss).
• Sophisticated decision-making techniques can be used as the quantitative
assessment provides a credible set of parameters.
• The results of the risk analysis process can be expressed in management’s
language. This makes it more efficient to help an entity to achieve risk
reducing objectives.
In summary, quantitative risk analysis can assist and strengthen privacy protection
from both technical perspective and educational perspective.
However, in the OSN privacy research literatures, quantitatively analyzing
privacy risk is still not mature. First, privacy risk analysis method should consider
the key factors of social network, some which are ignored in the current literature.
Second, the data availability, OSN structure and privacy policy may change. To our
best knowledge, the current methods are not sufficiently flexible with the change
of OSN environment. Finally, the measurement of privacy level is not clear. Some
methods use profile visibility as privacy level [19], and some others use number of
friends [25]. Therefore, inmanuscript 1, I introduce a framework, which is called
TAPE (Trust-Aware Privacy Evaluation), to quantitatively evaluate the privacy
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risk in OSNs. Particularly, the reliability analysis tool is utilized. The factors that
impact information propagation are divided into two categories and evaluated by
two metrics, including privacy awareness and privacy trust. The proposed TAPE
framework is also able to make recommendations to individual OSN user to fulfill
their privacy improving needs. the contributions of this work include:
1. the TAPE framework, which considers privacy leakage through nodes and
links separately and utilizes reliability analysis tools, as well as the definition
of privacy risk, in a quantitative way;
2. the privacy awareness and privacy trust metrics;
3. a privacy awareness algorithm, which shows a clear advantage over the known
algorithm called IRT [26] in the current literature;
4. the sensitivity analysis metric, from which we propose an efficient unfriending
strategy.
Our work can help people understand their privacy situations, raise their privacy
awareness and thus reduce privacy risks
1.2 Security of Online Review System
1.2.1 Online Review System
Online product/service review is an option for customers who have experiences
of using a product or service. A piece of review usually contains a rating value
and some text describing the aspects of the product. Examples of online reviews
include Amazon product review, Yelp restaurant review, and TripAdviser hotel
review. Online review system, also referred to as online reputation system, allows
customers to post reviews for products/services, and integrates these reviews to an
overall reputation score. This type of score reveals the average shopping experience,
such as product quality and customer service. Online review system helps people
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make purchase decisions, and hence greatly affect the profit of online retailers. It
is reported that 74% of consumers rely on product/service reviews to guide their
purchases [7]. A one-star rating increase can bring a 5-9% increase of revenue to
online sellers [8]. People are becoming more and more relying on online reviews
when evaluating the quality of products, hotels, restaurants, and vacation packages
before placing the order. “If you do build a great experience, customers tell each
other about that. Word of mouth is very powerful”, said by Jeff Bezos, CEO of
Amazon [27].
1.2.2 Fake Review
Online product reviews are becoming more and more important. However,
with the increasing popularity of online review systems, such as Amazon, TripAd-
visor and Yelp, and the profit growing of online markets [28], malicious users start
to abuse the convenience of publishing online reviews and intentionally post low
quality, untrustworthy, or even fraudulent reviews. It is reported that sellers at
the online marketplace boost their reputation by trading with collaborators [29],
and firms post biased reviews to praise their own products or bad-mouth the com-
petitors’ products [30]. According to Yelp official blog [31, 32], Yelp has been
using a review filter to hide certain suspicious reviews since 2005, which means
Yelp was aware of review fraudulence at the very early stage. Recently, both Yelp
and Amazon announced that they have sued several companies in order to block
alleged fake reviews on their website [33, 34].
Fake reviews, also referred to as review manipulation and review spam, can
inflate or deflate products’ reputation scores, crash users’ confidence in online rep-
utation systems, and eventually undermine reputation-centric online businesses
leading to economic loss. Furthermore, there are some situations, in which the re-
view manipulation is even more damaging. For example, Black Friday and Cyber
7
Monday shoppers heavily relies on online reviews, because they have to make rush
decisions for the products they are not familiar with in order to take advantage of
the ‘unusual’ discount that quickly expires. Another example is online reputation
of hotels and restaurants. The consumers, who are misled by manipulated hotel
ratings, cannot be easily refunded after they purchase these services.
1.2.3 Online Review System Protection
In the literature, researchers propose methods to protect reputation systems
from several angles, such as 1) increasing the cost of acquiring multiple user
IDs [35], 2) endogenous discounting of dishonest reviews by analyzing the statistic
features of the reviews [36], 3) exogenous discounting of dishonest ratings by intro-
ducing reputation evaluation of users [36–38], and 4) studying correlation between
users and reviews to detect dishonest reviews [39, 40].
There is a great demand to detect fake reviews thoroughly on the reputation
system. There are three directions of fake review detection. In the first direction,
fake reviews are detected primarily based on review features, such as the standard
word and part-of-speech n-gram features [41], and duplicated or near-duplicated
review text [42, 43]. In the second direction, dishonest reviewers are detected based
on reviewer features, such as through reviewer graph [44], frequency patterns [45],
and user correlations [39]. In the third direction, victim products are detected
based on the unusual changes of review statistics, such as the jump/drop of average
rating [39] and the arrival rate changes [46].
We argue that victim product detection is critically important and under in-
vestigation. First, compared to the huge amount of online reviews, the portion of
fake reviews is relatively small [47]. Fake review detections can be more efficient if
we can focus on only victim products. Second, some reviews may have limited im-
pact while some other may have major impact on the products’ reputation. Victim
8
product detection can help us focus on reviews that have major impact. Third,
online customers often care about the average rating more than specific reviews.
According to the statistics made by Social Barrel, on average one consumer con-
sults 11 online reviews before making a purchasing decision [48]. Knowing whether
the product is a victim can help customers make better decisions.
In manuscript 2, the Equal Rating Opportunity (ERO) principle is intro-
duced, by assuming that the distributions of certain review features should not be
related to the rating value. The ERO analysis is also proposed to detect victim
products. The contributions of this work include:
1. The ERO principle is introduced, which can reveal the fraudulence signal
of fake reviews. Importantly, ERO analysis provides a new angle how we
consider product reviews, and it can capture fraudulence signals missed by
current work
2. The criterion of ERO feature selection is introduced.
3. The ERO analysis is implemented, and the performance is evaluated by com-
paring with two other common methods and conducting expert reviews.
1.3 Summary
In summary, comprehensively investigating the multiple privacy and security
aspects of social media is of great importance. To address the challenges, this dis-
sertation focuses on two critical aspects, online social network privacy and online
review system security. In this dissertation, I provide reasonable answers to the
following questions.
• Q: How can we evaluate the behaviors of OSN users of spreading informa-
tion, based on the current data availability?
A: The information propagation is mainly through social connections and
9
individual user. The traditional sociology researches can address the eval-
uation of the impact of social connections, based on the strength of social
ties for example. In this dissertation, information propagation through in-
dividual user is evaluated by two metrics. One is privacy awareness, which
indicates a user’s privacy protection awareness, describing whether a user is
paying attention to her/his own privacy. The other is privacy trust, which
indicates how much a user’s friends trust her/him in terms of not gossiping
their information to others.
• Q: How can we detect the fraudulence signal of fake reviews?
A: Fake review is elusive, and the fake review signal is multidimensional.
Fake review detection is nontrivial. The existing approaches can work well
for some dimensions. We found a new angle that is not getting sufficient
attention, and we introduce the Equal Rating Opportunity principle and
ERO analysis to detect fake reviews from this new angle.
List of References
[1] S. Kemp, “Digital, social & mobile worldwide in 2015,” 2015, visited
on 2015-09-19. [Online]. Available: http://wearesocial.net/blog/2015/01/
digital-social-mobile-worldwide-2015/
[2] National Center for Missing & Exploited Children and John Walsh, “Teen
online & wireless safety survey: Cyberbullying, sexting and parental controls,”
2009.
[3] National Cyber Security Alliance, McAfee, and Zogby International, “2011
ncsa / mcafee internet home users survey,” 2011.
[4] T. Riman, “Social media and cyber stalking facts — ad-
vice and tips on staying protected,” 2013, visited on
2015-10-15. [Online]. Available: http://www.seomworld.com/2013/09/
social-media-and-cyber-stalking-facts.html#.Vlov7iCrTGg
[5] “How many people shop online?” 2013, visited on 2015-08-23. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2013/08/ecommerce-infographic/
10
[6] “U.S. online retail sales will grow 57% by 2018; projected growth,” 2014,
visited on 2015-03-25. [Online]. Available: https://www.internetretailer.com/
2014/05/12/us-online-retail-sales-will-grow-57-2018
[7] S. Bennett, “The rise of social media in e-commerce,” 2014, visited
on 2015-11-18. [Online]. Available: http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/
social-e-commerce/496484
[8] Q. Fottrell, “Yelp deems 20% of user reviews ’suspicious’,” 2013, visited
on 2015-08-09. [Online]. Available: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
20-of-yelp-reviews-are-fake-2013-09-24?link=MW story latest news
[9] S. News. “Mod secrets leaked onto the internet.” 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://news.sky.com/story/753966/mod-secrets-leaked-onto-the-internet
[10] B. News. “Israeli military ’unfriends’ soldier after facebook leak.” 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/8549099.stm
[11] EurActiv. “Social networks put careers at risk, survey finds.” 2010. [Online].
Available: http://www.euractiv.com/Social-networks-careers-risk
[12] A. Al Hasib, “Threats of online social networks,” IJCSNS International Jour-
nal of Computer Science and Network Security, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 288–93,
2009.
[13] B. Krishnamurthy and C. E. Wills, “On the leakage of personally identifi-
able information via online social networks,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM
workshop on Online social networks, Barcelona, Spain, 2009.
[14] S. Livingstone, “Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation:
teenagers’ use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-
expression,” New media & society, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 393–411, 2008.
[15] A. Felt and D. Evans, “Privacy protection for social networking APIs,” in
Web 2.0 Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, 2008.
[16] R. Baden, A. Bender, N. Spring, B. Bhattacharjee, and D. Starin, “Persona:
an online social network with user-defined privacy,” in Proceedings of the ACM
SIGCOMM 2009 conference on Data communication, Barcelona, Spain, 2009.
[17] S. Guha, K. Tang, and P. Francis, “NOYB: privacy in online social networks,”
in Proceedings of the first workshop on Online social networks, Seattle, WA,
USA, 2008.
[18] L. Fang and K. LeFevre, “Privacy wizards for social networking sites,” in
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World Wide Web, Raleigh,
NC, USA, 2010.
11
[19] P. Gundecha, G. Barbier, and H. Liu, “Exploiting vulnerability to secure user
privacy on a social networking site,” in Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, San Diego,
CA, USA, 2011.
[20] S. E. Schechter, “Computer security strength and risk: A quantitative ap-
proach,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2004.
[21] S. Strauβ and M. Nentwich, “Social network sites, privacy and the blurring
boundary between public and private spaces,” Science and Public Policy,
vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 724–732, 2013.
[22] H. In, Y.-G. Kim, T. Lee, C.-J. Moon, Y. Jung, and I. Kim, “A security risk
analysis model for information systems,” in Systems Modeling and Simulation:
Theory and Applications. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005, vol. 3398, pp.
505–513.
[23] G. Stoneburner, A. Goguen, and A. Feringa, “Risk management guide for
information technology systems,” Nist special publication, vol. 800, no. 30,
2002.
[24] M. Hamdi and N. Boudriga, “Computer and network security risk manage-
ment: theory, challenges, and countermeasures,” International Journal of
Communication Systems, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 763–793, 2005.
[25] R. Abdulrahman, S. Alim, D. Neagu, and M. Ridley, “Algorithms for data
retrieval from online social network graphs,” in IEEE 10th International Con-
ference on Computer and Information Technology, Bradford, UK, 2010.
[26] S. Guo and K. Chen, “Mining privacy settings to find optimal privacy-utility
tradeoffs for social network services,” in International Conference on Privacy,
Security, Risk and Trust and International Confernece on Social Computing,
2012.
[27] “Online extra: Jeff bezos on word-of-mouth power,” 2004, visited on
2014-09-19. [Online]. Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/
2004-08-01/online-extra-jeff-bezos-on-word-of-mouth-power
[28] “Final pre-christmas push propels u.s. online holiday season spending through
december 26 to record $30.8 billion,” 2010, visited on 2015-01-20. [Online].
Available: http://ir.comscore.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=539354
[29] J. Morgan and J. Brown, “Reputation in online auctions: The market for
trust,” California Management Review, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 61–81, 2006.
[30] A. HARMON, “Amazon glitch unmasks war of reviewers,” 2004, visited
on 2015-01-20. [Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/14/
us/amazon-glitch-unmasks-war-of-reviewers.html
12
[31] Yelp, “Yelp’s review filter explained,” 2010, visited on 2015-03-21. [Online].
Available: http://officialblog.yelp.com/2010/03/yelp-review-filter-explained.
html
[32] Yelp. “Why yelp has a review filter.” Visited on 2015-03-
21. 2009. [Online]. Available: http://officialblog.yelp.com/2009/10/
why-yelp-has-a-review-filter.html
[33] J. STEMPEL. “Amazon sues to block alleged fake re-
views on its website.” Visited on 2015-06-02. 2015.
[Online]. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/10/
us-amazon-com-lawsuit-fake-reviews-idUSKBN0N02LP20150410
[34] A. PICCHI. “Yelp sues companies promising positive reviews.” Visited
on 2015-08-19. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
yelp-sues-companies-promising-positive-reviews/
[35] M. Abadi, M. Burrows, B. Lampson, and G. Plotkin, “A calculus for access
control in distributed systems,” ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., vol. 15,
no. 4, pp. 706–734, 1993.
[36] A. Josang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd, “A survey of trust and reputation systems
for online service provision,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 618
– 644, 2007.
[37] P. Laureti, L. Moret, Y.-C. Zhang, and Y.-K. Yu, “Information filtering via
iterative refinement,” EPL (Europhysics Letters), vol. 75, no. 6, p. 1006, 2006.
[38] B. Yu and M. P. Singh, “An evidential model of distributed reputation man-
agement,” in Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Part 1, ser. AAMAS ’02. ACM,
2002, pp. 294–301.
[39] Y. Liu and Y. Sun, “Anomaly detection in feedback-based reputation systems
through temporal and correlation analysis,” in 2010 IEEE Second Interna-
tional Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom), Aug 2010, pp. 65–72.
[40] C. Dellarocas, “Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against un-
fair ratings and discriminatory behavior,” in Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce, ser. EC ’00. ACM, 2000, pp. 150–157.
[41] M. Ott, Y. Choi, C. Cardie, and J. T. Hancock, “Finding deceptive opinion
spam by any stretch of the imagination,” in Proceedings of the 49th Annual
Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language
Technologies - Volume 1, ser. HLT ’11, 2011, pp. 309–319.
13
[42] R. Y. K. Lau, S. Y. Liao, R. C.-W. Kwok, K. Xu, Y. Xia, and Y. Li, “Text
mining and probabilistic language modeling for online review spam detection,”
ACM Trans. Manage. Inf. Syst., vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 25:1–25:30, 2012.
[43] E. Choo, T. Yu, M. Chi, and Y. Sun, “Revealing and incorporating implicit
communities to improve recommender systems,” in Proceedings of the Fif-
teenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, ser. EC ’14. ACM,
2014, pp. 489–506.
[44] G. Wang, S. Xie, B. Liu, and P. Yu, “Review graph based online store review
spammer detection,” in 2011 IEEE 11th International Conference on Data
Mining (ICDM), Dec 2011, pp. 1242–1247.
[45] A. Mukherjee, B. Liu, J. Wang, N. Glance, and N. Jindal, “Detecting group
review spam,” in Proceedings of the 20th International Conference Companion
on World Wide Web, ser. WWW ’11. ACM, 2011, pp. 93–94.
[46] Y. Yang, Y. Sun, S. Kay, and Q. Yang, “Securing rating aggregation sys-
tems using statistical detectors and trust,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 883–898, 2009.
[47] C. Lai, K. Xu, R. Lau, Y. Li, and L. Jing, “Toward a language modeling ap-
proach for consumer review spam detection,” in 2010 IEEE 7th International
Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE), 2010, pp. 1–8.
[48] S. H. Dolor, “30 digital marketing statistics you shouldnt miss,”
2013, visited on 2015-11-18. [Online]. Available: http://socialbarrel.com/
30-digital-marketing-statistics-shouldnt-miss-infographic/53453/
14
CHAPTER 2
“Online Social Networks Privacy Study Through TAPE Framework”
by
Yongbo Zeng1, Yan (Lindsay) Sun2, Liudong Xing3, and Vinod Vokkarane4
is published in IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, 2015
1PhD Candidate, Department of Electrical, Computer & Biomedical Engineering, The Uni-
versity of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881. Email: yongbozeng@ele.uri.edu
2Professor, Department of Electrical, Computer & Biomedical Engineering, The University of
Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881. Email: yansun@ele.uri.edu
3Professor, Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, The University of Mas-
sachusetts Dartmouth, MA. Email: lxing@umassd.edu
4Associate Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of
Massachusetts Lowell, MA, Email: vinod vokkarane@uml.edu
15
2.1 Abstract
While personal information privacy is threatened by online social networks,
researchers are seeking for privacy protection tools and methods to assist online
social network users. In this manuscript, we propose a Trust-Aware Privacy Evalu-
ation framework, called TAPE, aiming to address this problem. Under the TAPE
framework we investigate how to quantitatively evaluate the privacy risk, as a
function of people’s awarenesses of privacy risks as well as whether people can be
trusted by their friends to protect others’ personal information. Simulations are
performed to illustrate the key concepts and calculations, as well as the advantages
of TAPE. Based on the TAPE framework, we also propose an unfriending strat-
egy in terms of privacy protection, which outperforms other existing unfriending
strategies.
2.2 Introduction
With the emergence of Online Social Networks (OSN), people are facing crit-
ical privacy risks. In OSN, personal information can be abused, which will put
users into risks. Researchers identified OSN privacy issues as two categories, in-
advertent disclosure of personal information, and stalking or backtracking [1, 2].
Krishnamurthy et al. studied the problem of personal identity information leakage
and how it can be misused by third parties [3]. This kind of information is able
to distinguish an individual’s identity either alone or when being combined with
other information that is linked to a specific individual, and its leakage will lead
to identity theft. Livingstone [4] demonstrated the risks when young people make
friends and share personal information to express themselves online. Real life sto-
ries of sensitive information leakage in OSNs happen frequently. For example, most
employers began to collect potential employees’ information using social networks.
According to a survey released on the EU Data Protection Day [5], privacy leakage
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had put people’s careers on risk.
In the current commercial OSN design, privacy risk is unavoidable, due to the
publicity of OSN [6, 7]. In order to benefit from the convenience of OSNs, peo-
ple share personal information with friends, which makes privacy leakage possible.
When privacy risk is unavoidable, we assume a risk and attempt to reduce the like-
lihood of harmful events. Under the assumption of unavoidable risk, risk analysis
becomes extremely important. According to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), risk analysis is defined as “the process of identifying risk,
assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level” [8]. In [9], In
et al. discussed the advantages of risk analysis, including designing secure privacy
management, monitoring and protecting critical data, making privacy policies, etc.
Risk analysis can be performed either quantitatively or qualitatively. Quan-
titative risk analysis plays a critical role. The advantages of quantitative risk
analysis are discussed in [10], such as using metrics to evaluate risk parameters,
analyzing risk events, making sophisticated decisions.
Solutions for addressing privacy issue include educational aspect and technical
aspect. For example, in [11], Gundecha et al. studied privacy issues and protec-
tion recommendations, for the purpose of educating OSN users and raising their
privacy awareness. The technical aspect includes managing privacy setting [12]
and adopting new architectures to build OSNs [13] [14]. There are also some other
categorizations in the literature. For example, in [15], Jeckmans et al. categorized
privacy research into 5 categories, including raising user awareness, law and regula-
tions, personal information anonymization, perturbing user information, and data
encryption. We attempt to solve privacy issue from another perspective – provid-
ing a quantitative privacy risk analysis framework for OSN users and researchers.
In the OSN privacy research literatures, quantitatively analyzing privacy risk is
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still not mature, as we discuss in Section 2.3. Therefore, we propose a framework
in this manuscript to quantitatively evaluate the privacy level of OSN users. We
believe that the proposed framework can help people to understand their privacy
situations, raise their privacy awareness and thus reduce privacy risks.
Quantitatively evaluating privacy level in OSN is a challenging task. First,
quantitative user privacy level is not a well defined concept in OSNs. Second,
human users play an important role in the personal information leakage. It is
complicated to predict an individual user’s behavior. Third, personal information
can be propagated through both online and oﬄine media by many ways, such
as chatting, emails, instant messages, Facebook postings, picture postings, tweets
on Twitter, etc. Fourth, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the
ground truth about a user’s privacy level, with which the quantitative evaluation
results can be compared.
In this manuscript, we address the first challenge by proposing quantitative
definition of privacy risk, based on privacy hazard and its probabilities. This
quantitative measurement will lead to the privacy level calculation tools, which
were originally proposed in the reliability analysis field. To address the second and
third challenge, we have to consider the availability of social data. Since nobody
can monitor the users’ all communication behaviors (online and oﬄine), researchers
have to work on limited data, which can be obtained with reasonable costs. In this
work, Facebook privacy setting is used as the primary data source. We also focus on
the ‘word-of-mouth’, which is the primary drive of OSN information diffusion [16].
Although other privacy leakage scenarios, which we discuss in Section 2.7.7, are
not considered in this work, the proposed concepts, including privacy awareness
and privacy trust, can be extended to those scenarios. For the fourth challenge,
due to the lack of ground truth of users’ privacy level, we compare the proposed
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scheme with some existing approaches, such as privacy concern model in [17] and
vulnerability analysis in [11]. In addition, Monte Carlo simulation is employed to
verify the results of privacy risk evaluation.
In this manuscript, we propose a TAPE (Trust-Aware Privacy Evaluation)
framework for quantitatively evaluating users’ privacy level in OSNs. The TAPE
framework contains several novel aspects.
• It finds the similarity between the reliability analysis in wireless sensor net-
works (WSN) and the privacy risk estimation in OSNs. It sets up the stage
for utilizing reliability analysis tools for privacy analysis.
• It considers the privacy leakage through nodes (i.e. users) and through links
(i.e. friend connections) separately. Here, the privacy leakage through nodes
mainly depends on the users’ behavior, and we define two metrics in TAPE
to estimate it. The first one reflects whether one respects others’ privacy, and
it is named as Privacy Awareness. The other one reflects how much one’s
friends trust her/him in terms of not gossiping their information to others,
and it is named as Privacy Trust. The privacy leakage through a link mainly
depends on the relationship between the two users, in terms of whether one
paying attention to the other’ personal information.
• It proposes the desirable properties of privacy awareness and privacy trust
metrics, as well as specific ways to calculate them under the guidance of trust
management theory. It is the first time that the privacy trust concept has
been used in evaluating privacy level in OSN.
Besides privacy risk estimation, the TAPE framework has the ability to con-
duct sensitivity analysis for friend links, which is similar to the concept of vul-
nerability in [11]. Through the sensitivity analysis, an OSN user can understand
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how much his/her privacy level is affected by a particular friend connection. The
sensitivity analysis yields a practical way to improve OSN users’ privacy level.
As a summary, the contributions of this work include:
1. the TAPE framework, which considers privacy leakage through nodes and
links separately and utilizes traditional reliability analysis tools, as well as
the definition of privacy risk, in a quantitative way;
2. the privacy awareness and privacy trust metrics;
3. a privacy awareness algorithm, which shows a clear advantage over the know
algorithm called IRT [17] in the current literature;
4. the sensitivity analysis metric, from which we propose an efficient unfriending
strategy.
This manuscript is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3. TAPE framework is described in Section 2.4, followed by discussion
of information spreading probability algorithms and the proposed algorithms in
Section 2.5. Privacy assessment and sensitivity analysis metric are presented in
Section 2.6. Experiment results and conclusion are presented in Section 2.7 and
Section 2.8 respectively.
2.3 Related Work
Privacy in OSN have attracted many attentions. OSN service providers allow
users to manage who can access which information (e.g. in Facebook and Google+),
and to hide sensitive information to non-connected users (e.g. in Linkedin). Re-
searchers studied privacy protection from two directions. Along the first direction,
fundamental changes to the current design of OSN were suggested to enhance
users’ privacy. Felt et al. [14] studied and discussed the privacy concerns of social
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network APIs for third parties. Guha et al. [18] proposed an approach to hide user
data by mapping real data to fake data. Within the first direction, “Privacy by
Design” (PbD) is an important approach. In [19], Wolf et al. operationalized the
concept of PbD through the process of design and development of OSN, and several
social requirements of OSN were identified to optimize the privacy from a user per-
spective. Encryptions are usually used when adopting PbD. For example, in [13],
Baden et al. proposed a new type of OSNs by using attribute-based encryption to
hide user data, in which symmetric keys are used to encrypt messages and only the
designated friend groups can decrypt the messages. In [20], Erkin et al. proposed
to use homomorphic encryption and multi-party computation techniques to hide
privacy-sensitive data from the service provider in a recommender system, without
losing the significant usability of data. The second direction is developing privacy
protection tools based on existing OSNs. For example, Fang et al. [12] developed
privacy wizards to give user recommendation for privacy setting, and Gundecha
et al. [11] proposed an approach to identify a user’s vulnerable friends. In this
manuscript, we propose to assist users’ privacy protection by providing quantita-
tive evaluation of privacy risk and conducting sensitivity analysis for friend links.
Our work belongs to the second direction.
There have been several quantification models for privacy evaluation in OSN.
Alim et al. [21] proposed a vulnerability quantification model which consists of
three components: individual, relative and absolute vulnerabilities. They exam-
ined the visibility of OSN users’ profiles and computed the clustering coefficient
to compose individual vulnerability. Based on individual vulnerability, relative
vulnerability and absolute vulnerability were calculated. Besides privacy risk eval-
uation, friend vulnerability analysis, also referred to as sensitivity analysis in this
manuscript, is considered to be a good way to improve personal privacy. Abdulrah-
21
man et al. proposed a node vulnerability metric [22] and a multi-agent vulnerability
analysis [23] based on the friendship graph of MySpace. Vulnerability index (V-
Index) was proposed to measure how vulnerable an OSN user is based on her/his
friends’ privacy setting [11]. Privacy setting and its implications were considered
as a primary factor in the existing models. In this manuscript, we consider pri-
vacy setting as one of the primary factors. The implications of privacy setting are
represented as two metrics – privacy awareness and privacy trust. Besides privacy
setting, the TAPE framework is able to adopt social tie analysis approaches when
implementing the module of link information spreading probability. The network
topology and information diffusion patterns are also considered.
The proposed work is also related to information diffusion in OSN. Gruhl et
al. [24] studied the dynamics of information spreading in weblogs. Adar et al. [25]
demonstrated a technique for inferring information propagation through a blog
network by applying epidemic models of information spreading. Cha et al. [16]
studied social cascades over Flickr social network. Researchers also attempt to
build mathematical model to solve problems of information diffusion in online so-
cial network, such as [26–28]. In addition, there are literatures discussing the
relationship between tie strength and information propagation [29], which is re-
lated to the information spreading probability that is discussed in this manuscript.
Different from the previous information diffusion work, the proposed TAPE frame-
work considers information diffusion in the context of privacy protection, which
requires different set of features and considerations.
2.4 Trust-aware Privacy Evaluation Framework
In this section, the TAPE framework is discussed in details. We first define
privacy risk from the perspective of information diffusion. The binary decision dia-
gram (BDD) which was commonly used for system reliability analysis is employed
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to calculate privacy risks. The concepts of node information spreading probability
and link information spreading probability are proposed.
2.4.1 Acronyms
OSN Online Social Network
PIO Personal Information Owner
UD Undesirable Destination
UG Undesirable Group
PA Privacy Awareness
IPA Individual Information Privacy Awareness
PT Privacy Trust
ISP Information Spreading Probability
NISP Node Information Spreading Probability
LISP Link Information Spreading Probability
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
BDD Binary Decision Diagram
BM Birnbaum’s Measure
IRT Item Response Theory
2.4.2 Notations
Ij Alice’s type j personal information
UG Alice’s undesirable group related to Ij
23
UDi Alice’s ith undesirable destination in UG
Vj Privacy risk for Ij
Zj Privacy leakage hazard for Ij
Lj Privacy leakage probability for Ij
ISP(.) Calculation of ISP
S The set of Alice’s privacy setting
sj Alice’s privacy setting for Ij
PAu User u’s PA
GPA(.) Calculation of PA
rank+u,j Proportion of users whose privacy setting for Ij is looser than user u
rank−u,j Proportion of users whose privacy setting for Ij is tighter than user u
〈A,B〉 Friend link between A and B
PTu User u’s PT
PTu,fi PT evaluation based on friend fi’s recommendation
GPT (.) Calculation of PT
TA,B Evaluation of how much A trusts B
R+u Positive recommendations for user u
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Figure 1: Online social network of Example 1.
2.4.3 Online Social Network Privacy
Some OSNs (e.g. Facebook and Linkedin) encourage people to use real names
and upload personal information onto a page known as ‘Profile’. Such personal
information is often accessible by friends directly, and can even flow to thousands
of other people through retweet (e.g. on Twitter), sharing (e.g. on Facebook) and
online communication (e.g. chatting). The privacy concern in OSNs is well known,
but how can we define the privacy risk in a quantitative way?
Before discussing quantification of privacy risk, we first look at two examples.
Example 1. Alice is a student, and she posted a piece of comment complaining
her teacher Cris on her social network site. Alice does not want Cris and other
teachers in the same department to know the comment. Fig 1 shows the example
social network.
Example 2. Alice posted a photo, and she does not want anyone, except her
friends, to see this photo.
25
Generally, in some scenarios, we want some personal information to be known
only by friends, and in some other scenarios we don’t want certain personal infor-
mation to be viewed by specific people [2]. In Example 1, the personal information
concerned by Alice is her comment on Cris, and in Example 2, the personal in-
formation is her photo. It is clear that an user has different types of personal
information, and that the privacy concerns depend on the particular type of per-
sonal information. We introduce the notation Iuj to denote user u’s type j personal
information. Without loss of generality, we present the framework in the context of
protecting Alice’s privacy, i.e. u=“Alice”. Alice is also referred to as the personal
information owner (PIO). In the rest of the manuscript, for simplicity, we use
Ij to represent I
Alice
j .
It is noted that privacy concerns are related to the “undesirable viewers”.
We define the concept of Undesirable Group (UG) of Ij, denoted by UG j, as
follows. If Alice does not want her information Ij to be seen by user ui, then ui
is put into UG j, where ui is also called Undesirable Destination (UD) of Ij.
In Example 1, Alice’s UG is {Cris}. In Example 2, Alice’s UG contains all users
except her friends.
In other words, if Ij flows to any UD, Alice considers her privacy of Ij be-
ing violated and privacy leakage happens. In the rest of the manuscript, for
simplicity, we use UG to represent UGAlicej .
Information leaking to different persons has different potential risks to the
PIO. Without defining UD, this difference cannot be captured. The privacy def-
inition based on UD is a more generalized definition. In this definition, users are
classified into 4 types:
1. personal information owner (e.g. Alice),
2. users who are allowed to access personal information according to the privacy
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setting (e.g. Alice’s friends),
3. users to whom the exposure of personal information causes damage (i.e. the
undesirable group)
4. users not belonging to the above three types.
In the existing work, people usually assume that there are no type 4 users,
such as in [11]. The definition of privacy leakage in this manuscript becomes the
traditional definition as long as the UD is defined as the complement set of the
type 1 and type 2 users. Our definition can also handle the cases that Alice only
concerns that the privacy leaks to a specific set of users, as seen in Example 1. In
other words, our definition can capture the fact that privacy leaking to different
persons has different damage to the PIO. Such difference is usually not captured
by the privacy setting alone.
2.4.4 Privacy Risk and Related Concepts
With the proposed TAPE framework, we aim to answer two questions: 1)
Can we measure the probability of personal information leakage as a measurement
of privacy risk in OSN? 2) How is the personal information leakage related to
privacy risk? In this subsection, we first introduce the key concepts of the TAPE
framework.
In [15], privacy is considered as keeping a piece of information in its intended
scope. In TAPE, the leakage of personal information Ij occurs when any users in
the undesirable group UG j view Ij. Here the undesirable group is the same as
the unintended scope in [15]. We assume that Ij can only be obtained through
online information diffusion, which only occurs through friend connections. This
assumption is a result of the limitation of data, as discussed in Section 3.2. In the
future, if more data are available, such as cell phone contact data, this assumption
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Figure 2: Core structure of the TAPE framework
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can be revised. Due to this assumption, the UG in Example 2 can be simplified as
{all of Alice’s 2-hop neighbors}. We define privacy leakage probability of Ij,
denoted by Lj, as the probability that at least one UD views Ij through information
diffusion in the OSN.
Lj = Pr{privacy leakage happens} (1)
In statistics, the notion of risk is often modeled as the expected value of an
undesired outcome [30]. That is
Risk = (probability of the accident occurring)
×(expected loss in case of the accident)
(2)
In the context of OSN, we argue that privacy risk of information Ij, denoted
by Vj can be computed as
Vj = Lj · Zj (3)
where Lj is privacy leakage probability as defined in Equation 1 and Zj describes
the expected loss/damage in case of privacy leakage. In this manuscript, we also
use another term “privacy level” to describe an individual’s privacy, and obviously,
the lower privacy risk is, the higher the privacy level is. In TAPE, Zj is referred to
as privacy leakage hazard and is normalized within interval [0, 1]. We argue that
Zj should be determined by the PIO (e.g. Alice) when the damage of the privacy
leakage is subjective. For instance, in Example 1, Alice may be the best person
who determines the damage if Cris saw her complain on Facebook? In many cases,
PIO is often the best person to estimate the damage/loss of privacy leakage. In
some other cases, PIO may not have the knowledge to determine the damage. For
example, in Example 2, Alice may not understand the consequence of revealing her
photo to strangers. In such case, Alice needs assistance to determine the damage,
such as the privacy leakage problem study in [3]. In this manuscript, we simply
assume that Zj can be provided by PIO. In the rest of this manuscript, when we
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compare privacy risks, Zj is considered as constant 1. Based on this assumption,
the privacy leakage probability Lj is equivalent to privacy risk Vj. The core task
in TAPE is to estimate the privacy leakage probability Lj.
2.4.5 Toward Privacy Leakage Probability Estimation
In TAPE, a social network is represented by an undirected diagram. OSN
users are the nodes, denoted as ui, and their friend connections are the links,
denoted as 〈um, un〉. As discussed in the previous section, personal information
can be diffused to unintended recipients through friend links. It is important
to point out that the existence of a link does not necessarily mean the personal
information will be transmitted through it. For instance, in Example 1, Alice
posted a piece of comment, but some of her friends may not read it. Here are three
typical situations.
• Alice’s friend Bob does not pay attention to Alice’s posting at all. Alice’s
comment does not disseminate to Bob through the link between Alice and
Bob.
• Alice’s friend Bob pay attention to Alice’s posting and read it. Alice’s com-
ment disseminates to Bob through the link between Alice and Bob. Then,
Bob respects Alice’s privacy and does not tell others about Alice’s comment.
In this case, Alice’s comment does not disseminate to others through Bob.
• Bob reads Alice’s comment, and retweets it. Such retweeting can be seen by
all Bob’s friends. In this case, Alice’s comment disseminates to Bob, and it
is possible to disseminate to others through Bob.
We argue that the privacy leakage probability estimation problem can be
decomposed into two tasks.
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Table 1: Concepts mapping
Reliability Analysis for WSN TAPE
System reliability Privacy leakage probability
Reliability graph Social graph
Source node Personal information owner (PIO)
Destination Undesirable destination (UD)
Node/edge failure probability 1 - node/link information
spreading probability (ISP)
1. Task 1: The first task is to estimate the probability whether a user’s personal
information will be disseminated through a particular component c (a link
or a node). In this work, such probabilities are referred to as information
spreading probabilities (ISP), denoted by ISP(c). The ISP of the link
between Alice and Bob depends on factors such as whether Alice and Bob
are good friends, whether Bob actively communicates with Alice in OSN, and
whether the information is interesting enough to catch Bob’s attention. The
ISP of a node is determined by complicated factors, ranging from knowledge
to personality, which is extremely difficult to quantify or even understand.
2. Task 2: The second task is to compute the probability of privacy leakage
(i.e. Lj), given the network topology, the information spreading probabilities
of links and nodes, the PIO (i.e. Alice), and the UG.
In the rest of this section, we first discuss the solution to the second task
(Section 2.4.6), and then present the solution to the first task (Section 2.5). Fig 2
shows the core structure of the TAPE framework.
2.4.6 Privacy Analysis and Reliability Analysis
When investigating information diffusion in OSN, we found reliability graph,
which has been used as one of the reliability analysis tools (e.g. WSN reliability),
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(a) Wireless sensor network example
(b) Online social network example
Figure 3: Similarity between WSN and OSN. In 3a, Sensor A detects fire, and the
detection will be sent to the server through other sensor nodes. In 3b, Alice (PIO)
feels her photos are improper to be viewed by Eve (UD).
can be adapted to solve the problem.
In a reliability analysis problem, the system is represented by a reliability
graph, whose links and nodes are assigned failure probabilities. The system
has a source node and a sink node that is usually a station. If there is no path
from the source to the sink can be established, the system fails. For example, in
a WSN, the nodes are sensors, and the links are the communication channels. A
sensor’s failure probability depends on its battery, environment temperature, work
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Figure 4: An OSN information diffusion example.
load, etc. A communication channel’s failure probability depends on distance,
environment noise, etc. In the context of reliability analysis, one often needs to
estimate the probability that there is at least one path can be established from the
source sensor to the destination sensor [31].
In the TAPE framework, we have defined the information spreading probabil-
ity for nodes and links in the previous section. This concept is kind of “opposite”
to the failure probability. For example, if node A fails to forward data to its neigh-
boring nodes with probability x, node A’s failure probability is x in the context
of WSN reliability analysis, whereas this node’s information spreading probability
is 1 − x in the context of privacy analysis. The goal of WSN is to transmit data
successfully, whereas the goal of privacy protection is to prevent personal infor-
mation from propagation. Therefore, in the TAPE framework, we can also define
failure probability of nodes/links as 1−ISP . We propose to use the binary decision
diagram (BDD) method, which is commonly used in reliability analysis [31–33], to
solve Task 2 described in Section 2.4.5. Table 1 shows the important concepts in
TAPE, as well as the concepts mapping.
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph created based on Shannon’s decomposition.
It is an efficient tool to manipulate boolean expressions. For example, in Fig 4,
Alice is PIO and Bob is UD. All nodes and links are assigned ISPs. In order to
calculate the information leakage probability Lj, we first use a boolean expression
to represent Lj.
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Figure 5: BDD graph of the example in Fig 4
Lj =ISP(e1)ISP(n1)(ISP(e4) + ISP(e3)ISP(n2)ISP(e5))
+ ISP(e2)ISP(n2)(ISP(e5) + ISP(e3)ISP(n1)ISP(e4))
(4)
Then, a BDD graph is constructed based on the reliability expression. The
BDD graph is a binary tree ( Fig 5), each sub-tree is considered to be a sub-
expression. The left sub-tree of a BDD node represents the expression when the
node successfully spreads information. The right sub-tree represents the expression
when the node fails to spread information. When traversing from the root to a
leaf node, if the leaf node is a left child, then it gives a information leakage case.
Based on the BDD diagram, we can evaluate Lj using a recursive method. The
details of the BDD approach can be found in [31].
When BDD method is utilized in the OSN privacy problem, one of the most
challenging issue is the computational cost. It is noticed that the size of the BDD
graph increase exponentially as the size of the network. The size of OSNs are too
large to make an efficient BDD calculation. In this work, BDD is employed to
compute the probability of information diffusion after modification. Due to the
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large size of the social network and the high computation cost of BDD, we adopt a
reduced BDD algorithm. In particular, we set the maximum traversing depth
as k times the number of hops between PIO and UD. For example, when k = 2
and the UD is 3 hops away from the PIO, the branches longer than 6 (3× 2) are
discarded from the BDD graph. In Section 2.7, we set k = 2.
2.4.7 Summary
By studying the similarity between the reliability analysis in WSN and the
privacy risk estimation, we modify the BDD method to evaluate information leak-
age probability. The concept of node ISP and link ISP are developed. The core
structure of the TAPE is shown in Fig 2. As a summary, TAPE is presented as a
framework to solve task 2 described in Section 2.4.5. In Section 2.5, we discuss de-
tails of ISP calculation. Particularly, the metrics of privacy awareness and privacy
trust are proposed for node ISP calculation.
2.5 Information Spreading Probability Algorithms
While most social network information diffusion models consider the impact
of nodes and links together [25], we argue that information propagation through
nodes and through links should be considered separately. This is why we define
information spreading probability of node (NISP), also referred to as node
ISP, and information spreading probability of link (LISP), also referred to
as link ISP, which can better describe the information diffusion process. NISP
is the probability that a node will spread others’ information, and LISP is the
probability that a link will be in the path of information diffusion. NISP and LISP
imitate the nature human communication process in the real world (i.e. oﬄine
social network).
• NISP describes the probability of speaking, i.e. talking about others.
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• LISP describes the probability of listening, i.e. hearing what is said.
In this section, we focus on the algorithm of NISP, followed by a brief intro-
duction of the LISP algorithms proposed in literatures.
2.5.1 Node Information Spreading Probability (NISP)
Evaluating NISP of a person is very challenging, because it is related to one’s
knowledge and personality. In the oﬄine social network, we probably can estimate
the NISP of a person based on experiences if we know this person well. Obviously,
such estimation can be biased and limited, and most importantly cannot be applied
in OSNs due to data limitation. Instead of resolving a challenging problem in social
science, we propose to examine NISP based on the quantitative data available in
OSNs.
In particular, we propose two metrics that should be used to estimate NISP
– privacy awareness and privacy trust.
Privacy Awareness
The first metric is privacy awareness (PA), which depends on a user’s
privacy setting. We argue that privacy setting reflects a user’s privacy protection
awareness, describing whether a user is paying attention to his/her own privacy.
There are many different ways to compute a user’s PA. In TAPE, PA evaluation
is a module. The input is a set of the user’s privacy setting, which is represented
as Su = {su,j|j = 1, 2, . . . , J} where u is the user and su,j is the privacy setting
for information Ij. Privacy setting has options {v1, v2, · · · , vM}, in which vn is
a looser setting than vm for n < m, and correspondingly, su,j can have a value
in {1, 2, . . . ,M}. For example, in Facebook, v1 = ‘everyone’, v2 = ‘networks and
groups’, v3 = ‘friends of friends’, v4 = ‘friends’, and v5 =‘self’. Let I1 be the photo
in Example 2. Alice’s privacy setting for I1 is ‘friends’, i.e. sAlice,1 = 4. Without
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Table 2: Desirable properties of PA algorithms
Special Cases rank+1 rank
−
1 Desirable PA value when
normalizing to [0, 1]
Case 1: Alice’s privacy set-
ting is looser than all others’
0 ≈ 0 PAAlice ≈ 0
Case 2: Alice’s privacy set-
ting is tighter than all others’
≈ 1 0 PAAlice ≈ 1
Case 3: Everyone has the
same privacy setting
0 0 PAAlice = 0.5
Case 4: Many users (includ-
ing Alice) have loose setting,
and a few users have tight set-
ting
0 small PAAlice < 0.5, and it should
be small, but not too small be-
cause most people share the
same opinion as Alice.
Case 5: A few users (includ-
ing Alice) have tight setting,
and many users have loose
setting
big 0 PAAlice > 0.5, and it should
be higher than PAAlice in case
7.
Case 6: A few users (includ-
ing Alice) have loose setting,
and many users have tight
setting
0 big PAAlice should be smaller than
PAAlice in case 4.
Case 7: Many users (includ-
ing Alice) have tight setting,
and a few users have loose set-
ting
small 0 PAAlice should be high, but
not too high because most
people share the same opinion
as Alice.
loss of generality, in the rest of this manuscript, we use S and sj to represent
Alice’s privacy setting set and privacy setting respectively.
Let PAu represent PA of user u and GPA represent the adopted PA calculation,
then
PAu = GPA(Su) (5)
The TAPE framework can accommodate many PA algorithms. However, what
are the design criteria for PA algorithms? Based on the possible distributions of
privacy setting and Alice’s possible adoptions, we identified seven special cases and
the desirable PA values in these special cases in Table 2, which serves as a guidance
for the PA algorithm design. To better understand Table 2, we define rank+u,j as
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the proportion of users whose privacy setting for Ij is looser than u, and rank
−
u,j
as the proportion of users whose privacy setting for Ij is tighter than u. As long
as we know the statistics of users’ privacy setting for Ij and the adoption of u, we
can compute rank+u,j and rank
−
u,j .
Example 3. Table 3 shows the statistics of birthday (I1) privacy setting as an
example. Alice allows only her friends to see her birthday.
In Example 3, s1 = 4, rank
+
Alice,1 = 0.5+0.4+0.1 = 0.55, and rank
−
Alice,1 = 0.1.
In the rest of this section, we look at the insights of spacial cases in Table 2.
We assume people can apply privacy setting for one type of information in Table 2.
However, it is easy to extend it to multiple types of information.
Case 1 and Case 2: In fact, these two cases rarely happen in real life. We
use them to demonstrate the extreme cases in PA calculations. In Case 1, Alice
chooses to open her information in OSN, while others choose to hide it, which may
indicate that the information is sensitive and releasing this type of information
does not benefit the PIOs. In this case, Alice should get a minimum PA value due
to the disclosure of sensitive information. On the other hand, if Alice chooses to
hide the information, while others open it. It may means Alice is prudent when
deciding to open information. Thus, Alice should get a maximum PA value in case
2.
Case 3: Without further evidence, it is difficult to interpret one’s PA. There-
fore, Alice has a neutral PA. In addition, if an action made by the majority, without
further evidence, the action should get neither a significant negative nor positive
assessment, e.g. neutral PA in TAPE.
Case 4 and Case 5: To see the insight of case 4 and case 5, we look at an
example. Assume many people release birthday information to friends because they
want to remind friends about their birthdays, even if they know the privacy risk.
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Table 3: An example: privacy setting statistics for birthday
Privacy setting Proportion of users adopting this privacy setting
‘everyone’ 5%
‘networks’ 40%
‘friends of friends’ 10%
‘friends’ 35%
‘self’ 10%
In this case, if Alice releases her birthday, her PA should not be largely reduced.
On the other hand, if Alice hides her birthday, her PA should be relatively high,
since in order to gain better privacy protection, she gives up the opportunity of
receiving more birthday gifts and greetings.
Case 6 and Case 7: Many people using tight privacy setting may imply that
the information is sensitive. If Alice adopts a loose privacy setting for this type of
information, her PA is low. On the other hand, if Alice adopts a tight setting, she
should get a larger PA but relatively smaller than that in case 5.
We have to point out that Table 2 may not include all possible cases. For
example, if Alice adopts a tight setting for birthday and a loose setting for phone
number, and Bob adopts a loose setting for birthday and a tight setting for phone
number, it is difficult to compare Alice’s PA with Bob’s. In such case, we need
more data to make the PA evaluation more accurate. At current stage, we argue
that those desirable properties in Table 2 provide a satisfying guidance for the PA
algorithm design.
PA Algorithm
In our proposed PA algorithm, individual information privacy awareness
(IPA) is calculated first. IPA is the PA value calculated from privacy setting of
one type of information. Let IPAu,j denote the IPA of u for Ij.
IPAu,j =
1
2
(rank+u,j − rank
−
u,j) +
1
2
(6)
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where rank+u,j and rank
−
u,j are defined in Section 2.5.1. It is easy to verify
that Equation 6 satisfies the desirable properties in Table 2. As an example,
IPAAlice,1 = 0.725 in Example 3. Obviously, 0 ≤ IPAu,i ≤ 1. In fact, people can
develop more sophisticated calculation to replace Equation 6, according on the
implementation environment and data availability. After calculating the IPAs for
all types of information, the PA of u is calculated by
PAu =
1
J
J∑
j=1
IPAu,j (7)
In the literature, there are some approaches proposed to evaluate similar metrics.
For example, in [17], the Item Response Theory (IRT) was used for modeling
“privacy concern”. In Section 2.7.1, we compare the proposed PA algorithm with
IRT privacy concern model.
Privacy Trust
We propose another metric to evaluate how much a person should be trusted
in terms of protecting privacy. Because this metric reflects how much one’s friends
trust her/him in terms of not gossiping their information to others, it is named as
privacy trust (PT). In fact, this type of trust is very difficult to evaluate based
on direct evidence. First, direct evidence is rarely available, because we cannot
wait someone to commit bad behaviors (e.g. gossip others) before estimating PT.
Second, the clues that people use to determine whether a person is trustworthy
in oﬄine social networks are usually not available in OSNs. Alternatively, indi-
rect evidence is used to predict OSN users’ PT. Such indirect evidence can be
established based on recommendations [34]. For example, Fig 6a shows a typical
recommendation based trust model. If A trusts B, and B gives a recommendation
saying that she/he trusts C, then A is able to develop certain level of trust to C.
In TAPE, we propose to evaluate an individual’s PT based on implicit rec-
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(a) General recommendation trust model
(b) Recommendation trust model in TAPE
(c) Multiple recommendations in TAPE trust model
Figure 6: Privacy Trust model
ommendations from her/his friends. For example, an implicit recommendation for
Alice from her friend Bob is established when Bob allows her to access his personal
information. Moreover, if Bob has a high PA value, it implicitly tells us that Alice
may be trusted not to propagate others’ personal information (Fig 6b). In real
life, a person working on privacy research (e.g. myself) usually has good atten-
tion to the protection of privacy, thus this person has high PA. If I choose to tell
someone my personal information, it means that I trust this person not to release
my personal information to others. Although such implicit recommendations have
noises, it may be the best resource to compute PT in OSNs.
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PT calculation in TAPE is a module whose inputs are PAs of the user’s friends
and trust evaluations that how much the user is trusted by friends. Let PTu
represent PT of u and GPT represent PT calculation, then
PT u = GPT (PAfriends of u , Tfriends,u) (8)
where Tfriends,u indicates how much u is trusted by friends. Similar to PA calcula-
tion, we argue that the PT calculation should follow 3 rules.
Rule 1. The level of PT depends on the number of positive recommendations. The
recommendation from a high PA friend is considered to be a positive recommen-
dation. The more positive recommendations a user gets, the higher her/his PT
should be.
Rule 2. Negative recommendations should be carefully used. On the one hand, if
a user with low PA trusts Alice, this should not affect Alice’s PT either positively
or negatively. On the other hand, if a user with high PA does not allow Alice to
view personal information, it is not sufficient to indicate Alice is trustless.
Rule 3. Although each additional positive recommendation can increase the PT,
such incremental diminishes when the number of positive recommendations is get-
ting very large. For example, when positive recommendation number increases from
3 to 6, PT can increase a lot. However, when the number increases from 300 to
303, PT should not increase as much as the earlier case.
PT Algorithm
In the literature, there are many trust models. We adopt a trust model using
Beta function to address concatenation propagation and multi-path propagation
of trust [34].
In the context of PT, the recommendation accuracy (arrow from A to B in
Fig 6a) is replaced by PA of node B, and the trust value (arrow from B to C in
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Fig 6a) is the implicit trust of B towards C, represented by TB,C in TAPE. For
simplicity, in the manuscript, we set TB,C as a constant value, by assuming that
when two users are connected in OSN, they have certain chance to see each other’s
personal information, but it does not necessarily mean they have already read or
will read that information. In the future, when more OSN data is available, such
as the nuanced privacy setting, TB,C can be calculated more accurately.
We use R+u to denote the set of positive recommendations for u, i.e. u’s friends
whose PA values are higher than a threshold (ǫ+). The PT calculation we adopt
is described as follows.
First, we estimate PT through one recommendation path
PTu,fi = PAfiTfi,u + (1− PAfi)(1− Tfi,u) (9)
where fi ∈ R
+
u is ith high PA friend of u. Then the variance of the estimation of
PTu,fi is calculated
σ2u,fi =


PTu,fi(1−PTu,fi )
2
2−PTu,fi
, PTu,fi > 0.5
PT 2
u,fi
(1−PTu,fi )
1+PTu,fi
, PTu,fi < 0.5
(10)
The PT is calculated using Beta trust model
PTu =
a
a+ b
(11)
where a =
∑|R+u |
i=1 ai − 1, b =
∑|R+u |
i=1 bi − 1 and
ai = PTu,fi
(
PTu,fi(1− PTu,fi)
σ2u,fi
− 1
)
(12)
bi = (1− PTu,fi)
(
PTu,fi(1− PTu,fi)
σ2u,fi
− 1
)
(13)
Calculation of NISP
PA and PT are surely two important factors that determine NISP. However,
PA and PT metrics are not probability values. No theories can be used to com-
pute NISP from PA and PT. In this work, we adopt a heuristic approach, which
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Figure 7: Node ISP Calculation Diagram
estimates the NISP as a weighted average of PA and PT,
ISP (u) = w · PAu + (1− w)PTu, (14)
where w is a weight factor between 0 and 1. Here weighted average is one of the
simplest ways to combine PA and PT. In fact, People can develop more complicated
calculation depending on the implementation environment and data availability.
In the experiments in Section 2.7, we choose w = 0.5. Fig 7 shows the diagram
of the NISP calculation. In the future, real human users must be involved (e.g.
questionnaire) to understand the relationship among NISP, PA and PT.
2.5.2 Link Information Spreading Probability (LISP)
As discussed earlier, LISP of the link between Alice and Bob depends on
whether Bob heard what Alice said. Furthermore, it depends on whether Alice has
a strong tie with Bob and whether the information is interesting enough to catch
Bob’s attention. In the current literature, many works have investigated social
ties [29, 35]. Note that the TAPE framework can accommodate any algorithms for
LISP calculation, as long as the outcome of LISP calculation is a value between 0
and 1 indicating the probability of information spreading. In this manuscript, we
do not propose a specific algorithm for calculating LISP. In the experiments, we
adopt a constant value for LISP and focus on demonstrating the impacts of PA
and PT.
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2.6 Privacy Assessment and Privacy Improvement through TAPE
By evaluating NISP and LISP, and utilizing the reliability analysis method,
TAPE has the ability to assess one’s OSN privacy level. More importantly, based
on the privacy assessment process, TAPE is able to tell people the strategies of
improving privacy level.
2.6.1 Privacy Assessment
As discussed in Section 2.4, by utilizing the BDD method and adopting proper
NISP and LISP algorithms, TAPE is able to evaluate privacy leakage probability
from the PIO to the UD. In real life, people usually want to avoid certain per-
sonal information being viewed by multiple people, which is the reason why we
define undesirable group. Without further modification, TAPE can solve multiple
UD case. Given an undesirable group UG = {UD1,UD2, . . . ,UDK}, K > 1, the
information leakage probability to UG is
LUG = 1−
∏
UDi∈UG
(1− LUDi) (15)
where Li is the privacy leakage probability to UD i. Here, privacy leakage happens
if any one UD gets the information.
2.6.2 Privacy Improvement Strategies
The goal of privacy protection in TAPE is to reduce privacy risk. From a
user’s perspective, the most practical strategy is to block a friend to access certain
personal information, also referred to as unfriending. In TAPE, we develop a
method that can identify the friend link which contributes to the privacy leakage
the most. We adopt Birnbaum’s measure (BM) [36] to find such a friend link.
Originally, Birnbaum’s measure was used to examine the sensitivity or im-
portance of a component in reliability graph. In TAPE, we use it to evaluate the
sensitivity of a friend link. Birnbaum’s measure evaluates the partial derivative of
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the leakage probability with respect to LISP of link c.
BM(c) =
∂L
∂ISP(c)
(16)
For the single UD case, the detailed calculation of BM, which uses the BDD graph,
can be found in [36].
We derive Birnbaum’s measure for multiple UD case. By rewriting (15), we
get
log (1− LUG) =
∑
UDi∈UG
log(1− LUDi) (17)
For the right-hand side,
∂
∂ISP(c)
∑
UDi∈UG
log(1− LUDi)
=
∑
UDi∈UG
(
−1
1− LUDi
∂LUDi
∂ISP(c)
) (18)
For the left-hand side:
∂ log (1− LUG)
∂ISP(c)
=
−1
1− LUG
∂LUG
∂ISP(c)
(19)
Plugin together, the Birnbaum’s measure of c for UG is
BMUG(c) =
∂LUG
∂ISP(c)
=
∑
UDi∈UG
(
1− LUG
1− LUDi
∂LUDi
∂ISP(c)
)
=
∑
UDi∈UG
αiBM i(c)
(20)
where αi =
1−LUG
1−LUDi
is the contribution weight of the ith UD, and BM i(c) is the
Birnbaum’s measure for c when computing the privacy leakage probability to UD i.
Finally, the unfriending strategy proposed in TAPE is to find a friend link, which
is
c∗ = argmax
c
BMUG(c) (21)
TAPE suggests to block c∗ to improve privacy level.
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Table 4: Case study: Rank PA vs. IRT PA
Special Situations
Privacy setting: s1s2s3 (0=open,1=hidden)
000 001 010 100 011 101 110 111
1
Percentage of users adopting this setting 70.50% 8.30% 8.92% 1.19% 8.83% 1.00% 1.10% 0.16%
IRT z -0.0648 0.1337 0.1337 0.3321 0.1337 0.3321 0.3321 0.5305
Rank PA 0.4448 0.6115 0.6115 0.7782 0.6115 0.7782 0.7782 0.9448
2
Percentage of users adopting this setting 8.36% 1.18% 1.05% 0.09% 70.53% 8.68% 8.98% 1.13%
IRT z -0.0169 -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0133 -0.0018 0.0133 0.0133 0.0285
Rank PA 0.3139 0.4806 0.4806 0.6472 0.4806 0.6472 0.6472 0.8139
3
Percentage of users adopting this setting 0.99% 0.17% 8.85% 0.97% 9.09% 0.93% 70.27% 8.73%
IRT z -0.3249 -0.1528 -0.1528 0.0194 -0.1528 0.0194 0.0194 0.1915
Rank PA 0.1856 0.3523 0.3523 0.5189 0.3523 0.5189 0.5189 0.6856
4
Percentage of users adopting this setting 0.11% 1.20% 1.01% 9.17% 1.05% 9.16% 8.98% 69.32%
IRT z -0.0081 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0010
Rank PA 0.0569 0.2236 0.2236 0.3903 0.2236 0.3903 0.3903 0.5569
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2.7 Experiment Results and Discussion
TAPE framework is implemented in Matlab, and the experiments are con-
ducted. The reduction factor of reduced BDD is 2, i.e. k = 2. In PT calculation,
PA threshold (ǫ+) is 0.5 and TB,C is 0.7. NISP values are calculated according to
Fig 7. At the beginning of this section, we first do a case study to demonstrate
the calculation of PA, and then we apply TAPE to two real OSN datasets. The
privacy risks and friends sensitivities are calculated. Several unfriending strategies
are compared.
2.7.1 Case Study
We compare two PA algorithms. The proposed PA algorithm, referred to as
Rank PA, is described in Section 2.5.1. The comparison algorithm is described
in [17], referred to as IRT. Briefly speaking, this scheme calculates a metric called
“privacy concern” based on privacy settings, by utilizing Item Response Theory.
The goal is to estimate OSN users privacy concerns toward information sharing.
Since there is no ground truth on what should be the most “correct” value of
PA, in order to demonstrate their major features, we compare these two schemes
in special situations. Assume Alice has 3 types of information I1,I2 and I3, and the
related privacy settings are s1,s2 and s3. The privacy setting is binary, either open
(represented by 0) or hidden (represented by 1). The column index in Table 4
is the possible privacy setting. We randomly generate privacy setting data as
follows. For each special situation, we first specify the proportion of each privacy
configuration (e.g. ‘000’, ‘001’, etc.), and then generate the privacy configuration
realities according to the distribution. 10,000 privacy configuration realities are
generated for each special situation. We conduct the case studies, and the special
situations we investigate are follows.
Special Situation 1 - Most users (88.91% for I1, 88.63% for I2 and 89.35%
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for I3) choose to open all types of information.
Special Situation 2 - Most users (89.32%) hide type 1 information. For type
2 and type 3 information, most user (88.75% for I2 and 88.92% for I3) open them
to public.
Special Situation 3 - Most users (89.02% for I1 and 88.82% for I2) hide type
1 and type 2 information, and for type 3 information 89.20% users disclose it.
Special Situation 4 - Most users (88.51% for I1, 88.48% for I2 and 88.85%
for I3) hide all types of information.
The PA calculation are shown in Table 4, in which the proposed PA algorithm
is referred to as “Rand PA” and the comparison scheme is referred to as “IRT z”.
We first investigate the range of each scheme. IRT z has narrow ranges for the
studied situations, although the theoretical range of IRT z can be (−∞,∞). In
order to adopt IRT z in TAPE as a PA algorithm, non-trivial normalization is
needed. On the other hand, the proposed Rank PA has a range from 0 to 1 as
expected. In addition, the neutral value for Rank PA is 0.5, and neutral value for
IRT z is 0. Then, we investigate both schemes according to desirable properties of
PA in Table 2 and get follow observations.
1. The majority always get PA values close to neutral for Rank PA, i.e. “000”
of special situation 1, “011” of special situation 2, “110” of special situation 3
and “111” of special situation 4. However, when IRT z is used, such majority
behavior cannot be captured.
2. Special situation 1 corresponds to case 4 and case 5 in Table 2. It is seen
that both Rank PA and IRT z satisfy the desirable properties of case 4 and
case 5.
3. Special situation 4 corresponds to PA case 6 and PA case 7 in Table 2. Rank
PA satisfies the desirable properties in PA case 6 and PA case 7. When look
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at “000” in special situation 4, IRT z gives a higher value than the same
privacy setting in special situation 1, which violates the desirable properties.
4. When investigating column “000” in Table 4, it is expected that the PA
values from top to bottom should change from neutral to small, because the
more people adopting tight privacy setting may indicate that the information
is more sensitive and opening it can yield lower PA values. Rank PA has such
trend, while IRT z does not.
In addition, IRT z is designed for binary privacy setting. However, real privacy
setting usually has more than two options, such as in Facebook. Additionally,
compare to the proposed Rank PA, IRT z also suffers from higher computational
cost.
2.7.2 Datasets
We use two datasets to conduct experiments.
Dataset I contains a small number of users with detailed privacy setting. In
particular, the privacy setting of 514 Facebook users in the community of Univer-
sity of Rhode Island (URI) are collected through a survey, and their public friends
relationships are obtained by a crawler. In dataset I, there are 16 types of per-
sonal information, such as ‘email address’, ‘mobile phone number’, ‘education’ and
‘status and links’. Each type has 5 privacy setting options, including ‘everyone’,
‘networks’, ‘friends of friends’, ‘friends’ and ‘self’.
Dataset II contains a large number of users with limited privacy setting in-
formation, constructed by the authors in [37]. It contains about 957,000 Facebook
users. There are 4 types of personal information, including ‘add as friend’, ‘photo’,
‘view friends’ and ‘send message’. Each type of information has 2 privacy setting
options, ‘open’ and ‘hidden’.
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Table 5: Datasets summary
Dataset I Dataset II
# of unique users 514 957,000
Average real degree 215.8 95.2
Average sampled degree 2.1 3.8
Max sampled degree 18 124
# of personal information types 16 4
‘everyone’ ‘open’
‘networks’ ‘hidden’
Privacy setting options ‘friends of friends’
‘friends’
‘self’
Information of the two datasets is listed in Table 5.
2.7.3 Privacy Risk
It is well known that the reliability of data transmission can drop significantly
as the distance (i.e. the number of hops) increases. In the context of privacy
protection, does the privacy risk heavily depend on this distance? We study the
relationship between the privacy risk and the distance from the PIO to UD.
We first randomly pick 100 nodes from dataset I and put them in the PIO set.
In each round of simulation, we pick one node (without replacement) from the PIO
set as the PIO, and pick another node from the network as the corresponding UD,
which is no more than 6-hop away from the PIO. If the picked PIO is an isolated
node (i.e. degree is 0), we skip it. For each pair of PIO and UD, we measure the
distance, compute the privacy risk using TAPE, and plot the privacy risk in Fig 8.
Each point represents one pair of PIO and UD. The x-axis indicates the distance
between PIO and UD, and y-axis is the privacy risk. In this experiment, LISP is
chosen from 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.95. We have the following observations
• As expected, when the distance increases, privacy risk has a decreasing trend.
• The privacy risk to 1-hop UDs (i.e. friends) can be greater than the LISP.
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Figure 8: Privacy risk vs. PIO UD distance.
This is because Alice’s friends not only get Alice’s information from Alice
directly, but also through other paths. For example, Alice’s friend Bob may
not hear what Alice said, but he could get the message from Charlie who is
another friend of Alice.
• When the distance is small, the privacy risk varies in a large range. The
distance is not a dominating factor. The PA, PT and network topology
jointly determine users’ privacy risk. A user who is 3 hops away may be
more likely to obtain Alice’s person information than a user who is 2 hops
away.
• As the LISP decreases, the privacy risk decreases. In the future work, in-
corporating the estimation of LISP will yield even a larger variation in the
privacy risk values.
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Figure 9: Histogram of proportional difference
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2.7.4 The impact of PA and PT
Since the lack of “ground truth” about the real privacy risk of users, it is hard
to compare TAPE with other privacy evaluation methods that consider different
features of the users. Instead of comparing TAPE with a specific method, we argue
that a prevalent type of privacy study in OSN only focuses on network topology.
We construct a comparison method, referred to as topology-based method, which
uses the BDD to compute the privacy risk with fixed LISP and NISP. By comparing
TAPE with the topology based method, we will see whether considering PA and PT
metrics reveals more information that is not captured by considering the topology
alone. In the experiment, we set the LISP to be 0.5, and set the NISP of the
topology based method to be the average of the NISP values when considering PA
and PT.
The experiment setup is similar to that in Section 2.7.3. We construct PIO
sets for both dataset I and dataset II, and each set has 100 nodes. In each round
of simulation, one node is picked up (without replacement) from the PIO sets as
the PIO, and another node that is 3 hops away from the PIO is picked as UD.
We calculate the privacy risk using TAPE and using the topology based method.
We define proportional difference as D = V
Topology−V TAPE
V Topology
, where V Topology is the
privacy risk calculated based on topology, and V TAPE is the privacy risk calculated
by TAPE. The histograms of D for both datasets are shown in Fig 9. It is seen
that the proportional difference range is from -25% to 5%. Hence PA and PT
do provide additional and useful information beyond the topology. In addition,
it is seen that dataset II shows more concentrated distribution around 0, and
dataset I has a wider range. It is known that, dataset II has 4 types of personal
information and each type has 2 privacy setting options, while dataset I has 16
types of personal information and each type has 5 privacy setting options. We
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Table 6: Impact of LISP value when comparing TAPE and the topology-based
method
LISP 0.2 0.35 0.5 0.65 0.8
Avg(D) 0.0129 0.0131 0.0130 0.0127 0.0123
std(D) 0.0590 0.0595 0.0592 0.0583 0.0571
argue that the comprehensiveness of privacy setting can impact the performance
of TAPE.
In the topology-based method, we set the LISP to be 0.5 and the NISP to
be the average NISP in TAPE. When choosing the NISP value, we argue that the
NISP setting favors the topology based method. Particularly, when PA and PT
are not available, it is very difficult to choose a proper NISP value for the topology
based method. By choosing the average NISP value from TAPE, we believe that
it will provide a reasonable NISP estimation for the topology based method. In
the rest of this section, we conduct experiment to study how much the LISP value
can impact the results when comparing TAPE and the topology-based method.
The experiment setup is the same as the one using dataset I earlier in this section,
and we repeat it by selecting one LISP value from {0.2, 0.35, 0.5, 0.65, 0.8} at
one time. The proportional difference D is calculated. We list the statistics of D
in Table 6. The proportional difference does not change when we select different
LISP. However, we have to point out that smaller LISP values will give smaller
privacy risk estimations, and we already observed it in Fig 8.
2.7.5 Verification of TAPE Calculation
In the previous experiments, the privacy risks are calculated from LISP and
NISP using BDD as described in Section 2.4.6. In order to verify this calculation,
Monte-Carlo simulations are used and the results are compared with the outputs
of TAPE.
The simulation is conducted as follows. At the initial stage, a node is selected
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Figure 10: TAPE vs Monte-Carlo simulation
as PIO, and the PIO owns a token, which represents one type of personal informa-
tion. During the simulation stage, we divide the time into T steps. At each step,
every node with a token can pass duplicates of the token to its neighbors. The
probability that node A successfully passes the token duplicate to its neighbor B
is ISP(A) · ISP(〈A,B〉), where ISP(A) is the NISP of A and ISP(〈A,B〉) is the
LISP of link 〈A,B〉. After T steps, the simulation is terminated. If there is any
UD that obtains a token duplicate, this simulation is marked as ‘information leak-
age observed’. By repeating the simulation N times, we will get N1 ‘information
leakage observed’ simulations, and the simulated privacy risk is N1
N
.
In the experiment, we randomly select 1,000 PIOs from dataset II, and those
whose degrees are less than 2 are skipped. The 3-hop privacy risks are computed
using TAPE. Corresponding Monte-Carlo simulations are conducted, in which N =
100 and T = 5. Fig 10 shows the results of our experiments. It is seen that the
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simulation justifies the calculation of TAPE, because a strong linear relationship
between simulated results and TAPE results is observed. It is noticed that the
slop of the curve depends on the number of simulation steps, i.e. T .
2.7.6 Sensitivity Analysis and Unfriending Strategy
Unfriending is suggested in [22, 38]. We propose an unfriending strategy
based on Birnbaum’s Measure, referred to as TAPE unfriending, which evaluates
the partial derivative of the leakage probability with respect to the LISP of a given
friend connection. In this section, we conduct experiments to compare TAPE
unfriending with 3 unfriending approaches.
1. TAPE: In this approach, the friend link that has the largest Birnbaum’s
measure is blocked and the privacy improvement is calculated.
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Table 7: Statistic summary of unfriending strategies
Strategy Average risk reduction std.
TAPE 0.076 0.024
Friend degree 0.052 0.039
V-Index 0.046 0.041
Random 0.039 0.039
2. Friend Degree: Usually, those who are popular in OSNs are considered to
be the critical points in information diffusion. Therefore, we examine the
privacy improvement by blocking the friend with largest degree.
3. V-Index: Vulnerability index was proposed by Gundecha et. al. [11], which
is based on privacy setting of friends. We use this approach for unfriending,
by blocking the friend with the largest V-Index.
4. Random: We also calculate the privacy improvement by randomly removing
a friend link. This approach helps us to understand the average case when
no friend sensitivity indicators are available.
The experiment setup is the same as that in Section 2.7.5. For each PIO-UD
pair, we use above approaches to remove one friend link and calculate the privacy
risk reductions. The experiment results are shown in Fig 11, in which the x-axis
is the index of PIO-UD pair and y-axis is the privacy risk reduction. The statistic
summary is shown in Table 7. We can see that TAPE gives the best performance.
It is important to point out that the privacy risk reductions are calculated using
the TAPE framework. It is not surprising that the Birnbaum’s measure, which is
based on TAPE, performs the best. On the other hand, we show that the other
unfriending strategies, which consider less information, are not as promising as the
proposed TAPE framework.
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2.7.7 Discussion
We define a probability based definition for privacy risk (level). Starting from
the quantitative definition, the reliability evaluation method is utilized to calculate
one’s privacy risk in terms of information diffusion. In TAPE, PA and PT are used
to capture OSN users’ privacy protection behaviors. TAPE can also compute the
sensitivity of one’s friend links, which can assist the user to adopt unfriending
strategies. TAPE can be a starting point of enhance OSN users’ privacy level.
Since it highly depends on data sufficiency, the OSN service providers who control
the most user data could be the best candidates to implement TAPE, and their
users can really benefit from it. In addition, it is expected that social links (LISP)
can also impact the calculation of privacy level. Real applications should adopt an
LISP algorithm while being implemented.
Privacy Leakage beyond one OSN
In TAPE, we assume that information can only be obtained through infor-
mation diffusion within OSN. In practice, information diffusion is a much more
complex process. There are several scenarios of information diffusion in social
networks.
1. Cross-OSN diffusion: People can be active in multiple OSN platforms.
For example, Alice is a friend of Bob on Twitter. She sees news about Bob
on Twitter, and then she posts some words about the news on Facebook.
2. Oﬄine diffusion: This is the traditional way we spread information through
face-to-face conversation, phone calls etc.
3. Online-Oﬄine diffusion: Information is propagated through both online
and oﬄine channels. This is the most common way we spread information
in the information era.
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Whereas scenario 2 is well studied in social science, scenarios 1 and 3 are
challenging. In all the three scenarios, the concepts of privacy awareness and
privacy trust are still valid. They have a great potential to be adopted in these
scenarios and contribute to a broader study on personal privacy leakage in a hybrid
online-oﬄine world.
2.8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this manuscript, we present a TAPE framework for the quantitative evalu-
ation of users’ privacy risk in OSNs. Mathematical tools (e.g. statistics, modeling
techniques) are used to process online social network data, and signal processing
tools are utilized in this work. The concepts of privacy awareness and privacy
trust are introduced. Simulations are performed to illustrate the computation of
privacy leakage probability, as well as to demonstrate that TAPE can capture use-
ful information which was not captured previously. Several unfriending strategies
are compared with the Birnbaum’s method of TAPE, and TAPE gives the best
performance. More importantly, TAPE sets up the stage for utilizing reliability
analysis, which is a well-developed field, to solve privacy risk analysis problems.
Besides BDD, other tools such as sensitivity analysis can surely benefit privacy
research.
Future work includes developing better PA and PT algorithms, implementa-
tion of TAPE as a Facebook application and performing real user testing.
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3.1 Abstract
Online market has been growing for many years. There have been huge profits
in online markets. Online product/service review plays an important role when
customers are shopping on the Internet. The purchasing decisions dramatically
depend on the product/service reviews. Sellers can benefit from creating fake
reviews to boost their products’ reputation or bad-mouth their competitors’ prod-
ucts. Fake reviews can seriously affect both buyers and sellers. In this manuscript,
we introduce a novel angle to detect fake reviews, which is called Equal Rating
Opportunity (ERO) principle. Based on ERO principle, we propose a fake review
detection method – ERO analysis, which is able to detect fraudulence signals based
missed by existing approaches. Experiments based on Amazon product reviews are
conducted, in which the applicability of review features for ERO analysis is stud-
ied, two common fake review detection methods are compared with the proposed
ERO analysis, and expert reviews are employed to evaluate the performance of
ERO analysis. The ERO analysis provides a new angle of fake review detection,
which is important when the fake reviews are diverse.
3.2 Introduction
Online product/service reviews are created by customers who have experiences
of using the product/service, such as Amazon product review, Yelp restaurant re-
view and TripAdvisor travel review. A piece of review often consists of a rating
value that represents the user’s overall satisfaction, and a text that describes the
experience of purchasing and using the product/service. Online review system,
also referred to as online reputation system, allows users to post reviews for prod-
ucts/services. The reviews of a single product/service are often combined to an
overall reputation score, such as the average number of stars in Amazon. Prod-
uct/service reviews have shown huge impacts to online sales. It is reported that a
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one-star rating increase can bring a 5-9% increase of revenue to online sellers [1].
On the one hand, the average rating can affect products’ display order on the site.
Products with higher average ratings are often put in front of the list and thus
can get more visibilities. On the other hand, customers are relying on the average
rating when they are screening products. It is reported 74% of consumers rely on
product reviews to guide their purchases [2].
However, online reviews may be manipulated. It is reported that sellers at the
online marketplace boost their reputation by trading with collaborators [4], and
firms post fake reviews to praise their own products or bad-mouth their competi-
tors’ [5]. Review manipulation can inflate or deflate products’ reputation scores,
crash users’ confidence in online reputation systems, and eventually undermine
reputation-centric online businesses leading to economic loss. Furthermore, there
are some situations, in which the review manipulation is even more damaging.
For example, Black Friday shoppers heavily relies on online reviews, because they
have to make rush decisions for the products they are not familiar with in order
to take advantage of these quickly expiring ‘unusual’ discount. Another example
is online reputation of hotels and restaurants. The consumers, who are misled
by manipulated hotel ratings, cannot be easily refunded after they purchase these
services.
In the literature, researchers propose methods to protect reputation systems
from several angles, such as 1) increasing the cost of registering multiple user
accounts [6], 2) endogenous discounting of fake reviews by analyzing the statistic
features of reviews [7], 3) exogenous discounting of dishonest ratings by introducing
metrics of users’ reputation [7–9], and 4) studying correlation between users and
reviews to detect fake reviews [10, 11]. In this manuscript, we propose a new angle
to detect products with fake reviews, which is called Equal Rating Opportunity
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(ERO) analysis. This method roughly belongs to category 2 and 4.
Fake review detection, also referred to spam review detection in some litera-
ture, is an urgent yet under investigation task. Unlike other types of spam, such
as spam email, fake review is much harder to detect. The main reason is that fake
reviewers can easily pretend to be honest. It is hard for a human user to recognize
them. Some work started the research of fake review detection many years ago.
For example, the opinion spam detection was proposed by Jindal and Liu in [12],
in which the authors built a classifier to detect review duplications. There is also
an example in the commercial field. Yelp has been using a review filter to hide
certain suspicious reviews since 2005 [13, 14]. We argue that fake review detection
has following challenges, which are the major obstacles of this work.
1. Fake reviewers’ behaviors may be hard to capture, and the fake reviews’
structures are diverse and usually unknown. For example, in order to suc-
cessfully mislead review readers, fake reviewers can make their writing styles
and review habits look very similar to honest reviewers. Without knowing
the structures of fake reviews, it is difficult to distinguish fake ones from
genuine reviews.
2. Fake reviewers can learn from the detection strategy to avoid detection.
Therefore, fake review detection approaches have to be robust. For exam-
ple, some existing work evaluate and assign trust scores to reviewers. Fake
reviewers can post genuine reviews to boost their trust score before they
creating fake reviews.
3. There is no ground truth whether a review is faked or not. By reading the
review text alone, we usually do not have enough clues to tell dishonest ones
from honest reviews.
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These are the major challenges that we think make simple behavioral heuristics
insufficient. To detect such elusive fake reviews, we need to consider more clues.
In this work, we introduce the ERO principle. The ERO principle tells us that the
sentiment of the review, such as the rating value, should not depend on certain
review features. If dependency or correlation is observed, it is highly suspicious
that the product contains fake reviews. Based on the ERO principle, ERO analysis
is proposed. ERO analysis has two major advantages.
• It does not require the cooperation of online reputation system owners. In
particular, many existing algorithms need to use a large amount of data,
which makes them impractical unless the reputation system owners (e.g.
Amazon and Yelp) implement these algorithms. Our approach, however, can
be implemented by a third party, who only needs to crawl a very small amount
of data to train the detection parameters and perform the ERO analysis.
Therefore, the proposed method is a low-cost solution, yields independent
opinions, and leads to practical implementations.
• ERO analysis is a new direction of fake review detection. It is compatible
with most of existing algorithms, which exam ratings and reviewers from
more traditional angles. ERO has a potential to find the fraudulence signals,
which were previously missed by existing approaches.
As a summary, the contributions of this work include:
1. The ERO principle is introduced. It is a new perspective how we can inves-
tigate product/service reviews;
2. A new categorization of review features is introduced, and the criterion of
ERO feature selection is studied;
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3. The ERO analysis is proposed and real data evaluation is performed. Par-
ticularly, expert reviews are employed to evaluate the detection accuracy.
This manuscript is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3. The ERO principle and ERO analysis are presented in Section 3.4, fol-
lowed by the discussion of ERO feature selection in Section 3.5. Experiments and
results are shown in Section 3.6.
3.3 Related Work
In order to protect online reputation systems, researchers propose many pro-
tection schemes, which can be roughly put into 4 categories. The first category is
increasing the cost of getting multiple user accounts by binding user IDs with IP
addresses [6]. The second category is endogenous discounting of fake reviews [7].
Dishonest ratings are directly differentiated from normal ratings based on the
statistic features of the rating values. In a Beta-function based approach [15], a
user is determined as a malicious user if the estimated reputation of the product
rated by him/her lies outside q and 1 − q quantile of his/her underlying rating
distribution. An entropy based approach is proposed in [16]. The third category
is exogenous discounting of dishonest ratings. Users are assigned trust scores based
on their review history, and the quality of their reviews are discounted according to
their trust scores. In [9], a user’s trust is obtained by cumulating his/her neighbors’
beliefs through belief theory. The fourth category is studying correlation between
users and reviews to detect dishonest ratings [10, 11]. The proposed scheme has
both category 2 and category 4 features, and the detection algorithm is from a
new angle.
Fake reviews can undoubtedly reduce the quality of reviews. They may even
mislead users to make wrong purchase decisions. Therefore, there is a great de-
mand to detect fake reviews thoroughly on the reputation system. There are three
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ways that can achieve the detection of fake reviews. The first way is directly de-
tecting fake reviews, primarily based on the features of review. For example, the
standard word and part-of-speech n-gram features are used in [17] to identify fake
reviews. Another major feature of fake review detection is review text. Some ap-
proaches rely on the identification of duplicated or near-duplicated text occurring
in multiple reviews [18, 19] The second way is dishonest reviewer detection. For
example, a graph-based method is used to find fake store reviewers [20], frequency
pattern mining is employed to find groups of reviewers who frequently write re-
views together [21], and user correlations are analyzed to identify fake reviewer
groups [10]. The third way is victim product detection. A product is considered
to be a victim if positive fake reviews or negative fake reviews are detected. This
type of detection often assumes norms of review statistics. For example, in [10], the
CUSUM approach is used, and the average rating is assumed not to jump/drop
dramatically in a short period of time. In [22], the changes of mean value and
changes of arrival rate are considered to be signals of fake reviews. The proposed
ERO analysis belongs to victim product detection.
Many research results did not turn into practical systems. This is probably
because of the potential liability concerns of major e-commerce companies, as well
as the gap between research and practical constraints. Without the support from
the e-commerce companies (i.e., reputation system owners), the algorithms can
only rely on a limited amount of data. This is one of the major hurdles. Currently,
there are only a few existing online systems providing review analysis services.
For example, there is a website called “ReviewPro” [23], whose major business is
to provide professional suggestions to hotel owners. By analyzing the customers’
reviews on a hotel, ReviewPro can provide analytical reports with “strategies”
to climb TripAdvisor rankings and earn 5-star reviews. Another practical system
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is “TrustYou” [24], which provides review analysis services on hotels. For hotel
owners, it provides service to market the reputation and increase businesses. For
individual users, it provides service to analyze the hotel’s quality, by summarizing
online reviews and generating a trust score for the hotel. What we propose in
this work is fundamentally different from these existing services. First, our work
focus on detecting review manipulation, instead of finding patterns for reputation
promotion purpose. Second, our work can provide on-demand real time service,
whereas ReviewPro and TrustYou can only offer analysis of a pre-determined list
of hotels. That is, our algorithm is so effective that it can detects fraudulence
signals based on the small amount of data crawled in real time.
3.4 ERO Principle and ERO Analysis
A product is considered to be a victim if it has fake reviews, either positive, e.g.
fake 5 star reviews, or negative, e.g. fake 1 star reviews. Victim product detection
aims to determine if a product contains fake reviews. In this section, ERO principle
and ERO analysis are introduced. To help the readers understand the underlying
thoughts of ERO principle, we first give a brief overview of a consistency analysis
method, which is introduced in [25].
3.4.1 Consistency Analysis
Consistency analysis is a victim product detection technology. The unusual
jump/drop of review statistics is considered inconsistent. Consistency detectors
are based on the fact that in order to perform an effective review manipulation,
the fake reviews must cause large enough change in the review statistics, such as
the average rating. In the literature, there are several approaches to detect the
inconsistency of reviews [22, 25]. In this subsection, we give a brief overview of the
one proposed in [25] called CUSUM.
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First of all, the notations used in this manuscript are defined as follows.
• pi is the product with product id i.
• ri,n is the nth review of pi, where the reviews are sorted by posting time from
old to new. n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
• ri,n = {xi,n, f
(1)
i,n , f
(2)
i,n , . . . , f
(K)
i,n }, where xi,n is the rating, and f
(K)
i,n is the
observation of the kth ERO feature. k = 1, 2, . . . , K
• Vector notations are also used. ri is the review vector, xi is the rating vector,
and f
(k)
i is the ERO feature observation vector.
Let µi be the true rating of pi and ν be trigger threshold, if x¯i > µi + ν or
x¯i < µi−ν, then jump/drop of average rating is observed, where x¯i =
1
N
∑N
n=1 xi,n
is the average rating. The detection functions are defined as follows.{
g+i,n = max(g
+
i,n−1 + xi,n − µi − ν/2, 0)
g−i,n = max(g
−
i,n−1 − xi,n + µi − ν/2, 0)
(22)
where g+i,n means the positive changes, g
−
i,n means the negative changes, and g
+
i,0 = 0,
g−i,0 = 0 for initialization. Rating inconsistency is observed when g
+
n or g
−
n exceeds
the threshold h¯.
In order to measure the degree of inconsistency, another metric, Percentage
of Change Interval (PCI), is defined as
PCI(h¯) =
ND
N
(23)
where ND is the number of g
+
i,n or g
−
i,n points exceeds h¯. Obviously, PCI value
depends on the selection of threshold.
It is pointed that a uniform threshold for all products is not applicable, and
heterogeneous thresholds should be used [25]. Briefly speaking, the threshold de-
pends on PCI(h¯0), where h¯0 is a predefined minimum threshold. Smaller PCI(h¯0)
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gives smaller threshold, and vice versa. In this manuscript, we use the PCI value
PCI(h¯) as the evaluation of rating inconsistency. PCI(h¯) = 0 means the ratings
are consistent, PCI(h¯) = 1 means strong inconsistency is observed. More detailed
discussion on PCI can be found in [25]
3.4.2 ERO Principle
The consistency detection, which is based on the statistics of reviews, can only
be used to find products that are suspected to be under review manipulation, but
is lack of the capability to accurately detect such manipulation. This is because
the normal rating can change without any manipulation. For example, when a
restaurant changes the chief, a seller changes his/her attitude toward consumer
complaints, and the manufacturer fixes a defect of the product, the ratings for
the restaurant/seller/product could change. The rating is also related to price.
Consumers tend to be more tolerant if they purchase deeply discounted products.
If the price changes dramatically, the ratings may change. Therefore, after the
consistency analysis gives us a set of suspicious products, we must apply a more
informative analysis to confirm the review manipulation.
We are inspired by the Equal Employment Opportunity Policy, adopted by
many employers. One example of such policy statement is as follows.
“All employment decisions at the company are based on business needs, job
requirements and individual qualifications, without regard to race, color, religion
or belief, national, · · · .”
We introduce the Equal Rating Opportunity (ERO) Principle, as follow.
ERO Principle. “The normal ratings should be primarily based on the quality of
the product or service, without regard to whether the review is posted on weekdays
or weekend, posted during daytime or night time, · · · .”
This principle is based on the idea that the fake reviewers may maintain a lot
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of user accounts and review templates, and if they perform review manipulation
on a product, it can change the distribution of some features. It is also possible
that some fake reviewers are not working full time, they may focus on writing
fake reviews during their spare time, such as evenings and weekends. This type of
unusual correlation is called fraudulence signal. For example, if the fake positive
reviews are posted one specific days, such weekends, it will increase the correlation
between the ‘day of week’ feature and rating value. If the fake reviewers randomly
select user accounts from a large account pool and post fake reviews on a random
day, the fraudulence signal can also be detected as long as an appropriate feature
is used, such as whether the reviewer purchased the product and reviewer city.
3.4.3 ERO Feature
Review features applied to ERO principle are called ERO feature. A re-
view often has multiple features, such as rating value, review text, review date,
reviewer’s name and reviewer’s reviewing history. Obviously, some review features
may not be applicable for ERO principle. For example, people who give 5 star
reviews in Amazon tend to write short text, and those who give 1 star and 2 star
reviews are more likely to write long text to express their complaint. Therefore, the
text length being correlated to the rating value cannot be considered as a violation
of ERO principle. This example is also observed in Section 3.5.
If we can find a review feature that statistically cannot be correlated to rating
value, then the feature is called ERO feature. ERO principle holds upon ERO
features. One example is the ‘day of week’ feature. The percentage of negative
review and the percentage of positive review cannot significantly vary when we look
at on which day of a week the reviews were posted. If the percentage of positive
reviews in weekends are found much higher than on weekdays, it is highly suspicious
that the product suffers fake reviews. Some other ERO features examples are ‘time
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in a day’ and ‘verified’. The detailed discussion of ERO feature and ERO feature
selection is presented in Section 3.5.
3.4.4 ERO Analysis
Based on ERO principle, we propose ERO analysis for fake review detection.
ERO analysis takes the rating value vector xi and the ERO feature observation
vector f
(k)
i as inputs, and outputs the ERO value as well as the detection results,
i.e. suspicious or normal. Let E
(k)
i denote the ERO value upon feature f
(k)
i . We
employ the Pearson correlation coefficient as the ERO calculation.
E
(k)
i =
cov(xi, f
(k)
i )
σxiσf (k)
i
(24)
where cov(xi, f
(k)
i ) is the covariance of xi and f
(k)
i , σxi is the standard deviation of
xi, and σf (k)
i
is the standard deviation of f
(k)
i . 0 ERO value means no correlation.
1 or -1 ERO value means absolutely correlated. Generally, the larger the absolute
ERO value is, the stronger the correlation is.
A nonzero ERO value is not sufficient to make decision, because the ERO
value can be noisy. First, ERO value is an estimation of the Pearson correlation
coefficient. The estimation error depends on the number of samples. Second,
honest reviewers can have bias on their reviews, based on their preferences for
example. Some reviewers may be hypercritical and give low rating just because
of tiny problems; Some other reviewers may tolerate tiny problems and still speak
highly of the product. In this work, the boxplot [26] technology is used to determine
the detection thresholds. Briefly speaking, the thresholds depend on the observed
noise.
For a given ERO feature f
(k)
i , we have M products to calculate the detection
thresholds. First, the ERO value of each product, E
(k)
d1 , E
(k)
d2 , . . . , E
(k)
dM , is calculated
by Equation 24. Next, the first quartile, denoted by q1, and the third quartile,
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denoted by q3, are calculated respectively. Finally, the detection thresholds are
calculated as {
θupper = q3 + w(q3 − q1)
θlower = q1 − w(q3 − q1)
(25)
where w is the sensitivity factor. Smaller w makes the detector easier to alarm
and thus can achieve higher detection rate as well as higher false alarm rate.
(θupper, θlower) is called safe interval. ERO values within the safe interval are consid-
ered normal, otherwise suspicious. In other words, if E
(k)
i < θlower or E
(k)
i > θupper,
then the ERO analysis upon feature f
(k)
i alarms that pi is highly suspicious suffer-
ing fake reviews.
There can be multiple ERO features, which means K > 1. Different detection
thresholds are used for different ERO features. Meanwhile, multiple ERO features
provide multiple detection results. In this manuscript, we consider the product to
be suspicious when at least one ERO feature alarms. In practice, the detection fu-
sion method can be more sophisticated, depending on the number of ERO features
and the required detection rate or false alarm rate.
3.4.5 Case Study
In this section, we use 4 real products to demonstrate the proposed ERO
principle and ERO analysis. The review data are collected from Amazon (see
Section 3.6.2 for more details).
We use two ERO features – ‘verified’ and ‘day of week’. Briefly, a review is said
‘verified’ if the reviewer purchased the product. The ‘day of week’ feature means
on which day of a week the review was posted. We select four typical products.
According to ERO analysis, two of them are considered normal and the other two
are determined suspicious. The review details are shown in Fig 12.
In Fig 12a, we observed that the percentage of non-verified reviews is not
related to the rating, for which the ERO value is 0.04. Similarly, in Fig 12c, the
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(a) Normal case, ‘verified’ feature
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(b) Suspicious case, ‘verified’ feature
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(c) Normal case, ‘day of week’ feature
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(d) Suspicious case, ‘day of week’ feature
Figure 12: ERO principle examples
percentages of positive review (4 star and 5 star) and negative review (1 star and
2 star) are not related to ‘day of week’ feature, for which the ERO value is -0.03.
Therefore, those two products are determined to be normal by ERO analysis.
Conversely, in Fig 12b, the ‘verified’ feature shows certain correlation with rating
value, for which the ERO value is 0.42. In Fig 12d, the percentage of negative
reviews on Sundays is much different from on other days, for which the ERO value
is 0.33. Since relatively strong correlations are observed, those two products are
determined to be suspicious.
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3.5 ERO Feature Selection
As we discussed earlier in Section 3.4.3, a reviews often has multiple features.
Some of them are applicable for ERO principle, and some other are not. In this
section, we discuss the strategies how ERO features are selected.
3.5.1 Review Feature Categorization
In some literatures, review features are categorized into three types – product
specific feature, review specific feature and reviewer specific feature, based on the
feature oringins [17, 27]. Product specific feature, also referred to as product meta-
information, describes the product’s properties, such as price, discount rate and
category. Review specific feature describes the review’s characteristics, such as
review text, number of votes and review date. Reviewer specific feature describes
the reviewer’s profile and history, such as number of reviews posted by the reviewer,
reviewer ranking and number of votes.
In the context of ERO analysis, since the analysis is conducted for specific
product, the product specific feature is not used. ERO features are selected from
the review specific feature and the reviewer specific feature categories.
When considering the features’ applicability of ERO analysis, we categorize
review features into three groups rather than the ones mentioned earlier.
• Persistent Feature is defined to be the features being determined when
the review was posted and will never change. For example, the review date
was determined when a review was posted, and it cannot change again. An-
other example is ‘verified’ feature. Whether a review is verified has to be
determined at the time when the review was posted based on the reviewer’s
purchase history.
• Acquired Feature is defined to be the features acquired after the review
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was posted. For example, when people think a review is useful, they will
vote it as helpful and thereby increase the number of helpful votes and total
votes. The number of votes may keep changing as long as it is accessible.
• Accumulative Feature is defined to be the features that had already ex-
isted before the review was posted and will keep changing. For example, the
number of lifetime reviews of a reviewer will keep increasing as long as the
reviewer keeps posting reviews.
We argue that the ERO features should be selected from the Persistent cate-
gory. The Acquired and Accumulative categories are usually not suitable for ERO
analysis. We summarize two criterions that can guide ERO feature selection.
The first criterion is causality. Recall that the ERO principle tells us that
the rating value should depend on the product quality and purchase experience
but other factors, i.e. ERO features. In other words, it is impossible to predict
the rating value based on uncorrelated features. For example, when considering
whether the user purchased the product, reviews can be divided into two groups
– verified and non-verified. The ‘verified’ information cannot help us predict the
rating value. In contrast, we observed that negative reviews tend to have longer
review text (see Section 3.5.2). Therefore, given the text length of a review, we are
able to predict the rating value, and the prediction should be more accurate than
guessing. Theoretically, causation implies correlation, but correlation does not
necessarily imply causation. Therefore, an ERO feature should not have causality
with rating value directly or indirectly.
The second criterion is stability. If a review feature’s observations are changed
after reviews were posted, then the feature is said unstable. An unstable feature
is not suitable for ERO analysis, because the observations depend on some other
factors. For example, there are two similar reviews – R1 and R2, and they are
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Table 8: Review features
Name Type Description
Total votes Non-negative in-
teger
The number of votes given by review readers.
Day of week 1 to 7 On which day of week the review was posted.
It starts from Sunday (value=1).
Content length Non-negative in-
teger
The length of the review text, counting by char-
acters.
Reviewer’s
number of
lifetime reviews
Positive integer The number of reviews posted by the reviewer
as of the time of data collection.
Reviewer rank-
ing
Positive integer Reviewer ranking in Amazon system. Smaller
ranking value means higher ranking.
Verified Boolean Whether the reviewer purchased the product
when they posting the review.
considered to be the same helpful. However, R1 was posted one year earlier than
R2. The number of helpful votes of R1 could be much higher than R2. In addition,
some unstable features can promote other unstable features. For example, the
reviewer’s number of lifetime reviews, reviewer ranking and number of helpful votes
may affect the review display order. The display order can also affect the number
of helpful votes and thereby reviewer ranking. The correlation of unstable features
usually only reveals the fraudulence signal, but also some implicit relationship.
Therefore, the Acquired and Accumulative categories are not suitable for ERO
analysis.
In summary, a review feature is not applicable for ERO analysis, if 1) it is
not Persistent, 2) causuality observed, or 3) it is unstable.
3.5.2 Feature Comparison
In this subsection, we use real data to demonstrate the feature selection pro-
cess. The data were collected from Amazon (refer to Section 3.6.2). There are
total 416 products randomly selected from the dataset. The review features inves-
tigated in this section are listed in Table 9. We calculate the ERO values of all
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Figure 13: Review features
those features for the 416 products. The results is plotted in Fig 13.
Total Votes
‘Total votes’ feature means the number of votes the review got. From Fig 13,
we observe that it has negative correlation with the rating value. In other words,
negative reviews (1 star and 2 star) potentially get more votes than positive ones.
When looking at the reviews, we find that negative reviews often have longer
and more informative texts while positive reviews often have shorter texts. The
possible reason is that when people are reading reviews, they tend to give votes to
the reviews with longer texts.
Day of Week
From Fig 13, we can see the irrelevance between ‘day of week’ feature and
rating value. Statistically, the numbers of reviews on a day of week may not be
identical, but the ratio between negative and positive review numbers can not
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significantly vary. Therefore, small ERO values are observed.
Content Length
The ‘content length’, also called text length, has negative correlation with the
rating value. It is likely that customers with negative experience have more to
complain, and therefore their review texts are longer. Note that this observation
also confirms the one we get for the ‘total votes’ feature.
Reviewer’s Number of Lifetime Reviews
When investigating the number of lifetime reviews that the reviewer has
posted, we find that reviewers with more reviews tend to post positive reviews.
In Fig 13, a positive correlation is observed. It is likely that experienced reviewers
are more tolerant to negative exiperience.
Reviewer Ranking
The reviewer ranking has negative correlation with the rating value, which
means higher ranked reviewers tend to give positive reviews. It also partially
confirms the observation of ‘reviewer’s number of lifetime reviews’, since in Amazon
system, the reviewer ranking has certain relationship to the number of lifetime
reviews.
Verified
A review is verified if the reviewer purchased the product before he/she posting
the review. In Fig 13, there is no strong correlation observed for ‘verified’ feature.
Summary
The average correlations are calculated and shown in Table 9. In summary,
there are two features applicable for ERO analysis, including ‘day of week’ and
‘verified’. There are correlations observed for the other features, and some of
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Table 9: Review features summary
Name Mean correla-
tion
Std. correla-
tion
Category Causuality Stability
Total votes -0.0844 0.1029 Acquired Probably No
Day of week -0.0067 0.0642 Persistent No Yes
Content length -0.1245 0.1101 Persistent Probably Yes
Reviewer number
of reviews
0.0836 0.0693 Accumulative Probably No
Reviewer ranking -0.0716 0.0895 Accumulative Probably No
Verified 0.0080 0.0604 Persistent No Yes
them have causality observed with rating value, such as ‘total votes’ and ‘content
length’. Some of them are unstable, such as ‘total votes’ and ‘reviewer ranking’.
The ERO features are selected by comparing the average ERO value with empirical
thresholds, which is 0.01 and -0.01 in this work.
3.6 Experiment and Results
The proposed ERO analysis is implemented and experiments are conducted
in this section. We first build a web crawling system and crawl review data from
Amazon. ERO analysis is applied and suspicious products are picked up. Then,
expert reviews are employed to evaluate the detection performance. The ERO
analysis is implemented in Matlab, and the crawling system is build in Python.
3.6.1 Performance Evaluation
Unlike fraudulence detection in a traditional system, such as email spam, it is
often hard to get ground truth for fake reviews in a product/service review system.
Lack of ground truth is one of challenges when study online review fraudulence. To
our best knowledge, there is no research work that can perfectly address this issue.
However, researchers have made several attempts to evaluate the performance of
a fake review detection.
Previous research employed different approaches to obtain ground truth data.
There are mainly three types of approaches. First, some early work manually
inspect reviews and extract simple features such as duplicated and near-duplicated
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Table 10: Review feature crawled from Amazon
Product Review Reviewer
ASIN Rating value Customer ID
Average rating # of helpful votes Reviewer ranking
Category # of total votes # of helpful received votes
Review date # of total received votes
Review text # of reviews
Verified review or not # of verified reviews
reviews or unexpected rating patterns [19]. This type of approach is limited since
it largely depends on heuristics and the assumption that fake review structures
are known. Second, a few researchers create ground truth data by hiring people to
write fake reviews [25, 28]. They then develop detectors that compare the features
of genuine and fake reviews. Although these classifiers have performed well with
those artificial data, it is questionable whether datasets generated by hired people
can be representative of actual fake reviews in practice. The third type is employing
expert reviews. For example, Mukherjee et al. generated ground truth by hiring
experts to manually detect fake reviews given some intuitive features and hints [27].
In this work, we adopt the third approach, in which we employ expert reviewers
to evaluate the detection accuracy.
In addition, we argue that the detection accuracy should be presented as False
Alarm Rate (FAR). Although the other metric – Detection Rate (DR) might be
more intuitive, it is hard to estimate due to the lack of ground truth. Fake reviews
are complex and multidimensional. It is extremely difficult for a single method
to achieve high accuracy. Multiple detection methods have to be used together to
capture different aspects of fake reviews.
3.6.2 Dataset
We develop web crawlers to collect real data from Amazon. The crawlers are
implemented in Python [29]. The dataset we use in the experiments are collected
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Table 11: Summary of dataset
Number of products 916
Number of reviews 418549
Average product rating 3.98
Product categories ‘Toys and Games’ and ‘Electronics’
under several guidelines.
1. The number of reviews is greater than 50.
2. The average rating is between 2.5 and 4.8.
3. Product category is either ‘Toys and Games’ or ‘Electronics’.
4. We only collect the first 40 pages of each category.
For each product, there are 3 types of information crawled.
1. Product meta-information. The product ASIN (Amazon Standard Identifi-
cation Number), average rating and category are obtained.
2. Review information, such as rating value, date, text, number of votes, etc.
are crawled from Amazon.
3. Reviewer information, such as customer ID, reviewer ranking, number of
reviews, etc. are crawled from Amazon.
Table 10 shows the detail information we obtained. There are 916 products col-
lected. A summary of the dataset is shown in Table 11.
3.6.3 Victim Product Detection Comparison
The ‘verified’ feature and ‘day of week’ feature are used in the experiment. In
this section, we compare the ERO analysis results with two common approaches.
One is the consistency detection that is described in Section 3.4.1. The other is
duplication detection described in [19].
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Table 12: Experiment parameters
Approach Parameters
ERO w = 2
µi =average rating
Consistency ν = 0.6
h¯0 = 3
All the 916 products are analyzed by the three detection methods. For con-
sistency detection, the trigger threshold we used is ν = 0.6, and the minimum
threshold h¯0 = 3. More details of consistency detection can be found in Sec-
tion 3.4.1. In ERO analysis, the boxplot method is applied on the 916 products, by
which the detection thresholds are θupper = 0.16, θlower = −0.17 for ‘day of week’
feature, and θupper = 0.1, θlower = −0.15 for ‘verified’ feature. There are 16 prod-
ucts detected to be suspicious. We compare the pdetection results, and display the
comparison in Fig 14. The ERO analysis detects 16 suspicious products, including
7 products detected by ‘day of week’ feature and 9 products detected by ‘veri-
fied’ feature. The consistency method detects 28 products, while the duplication
method detects 123 products. We have following observations.
• There are small overlaps among the three methods. One product is detected
by both ERO analysis and duplication method, and two products are de-
tected by both consistency and duplication methods. Fake reviews have very
diverse structures. Single method is not able to detect all those structures.
ERO analysis is important if the false alarm rate is relatively low, as it
provides a new angle that missed by existing methods, such as duplication
method and consistency method.
• There are 123 products detected by duplication method. We look at the
products detected by duplication method and find that some duplicated texts
are just “5 star”, “excellent”, “I like it” and some common phrases. Without
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Figure 14: Fake review detection comparison
Table 13: Expert review
Verified Day of Week Total
False Alarm Rate 11.1% 0 6.3%
Confidence Change 8.6% 12.3% 10.5%
further information, it is hard to tell whether they are fake. It is highly
possible that the duplication method has a high false alarm rate. There are
16 products detected by the ERO analysis. The detection rate may be low.
However, considering the diverse of fake review structures and the specific
angle captured by ERO analysis, the low detection rate is reasonable as long
as the false alarm rate is relatively high.
It is noticed that the thresholds of those detection methods impact the de-
tection rate and overlaps. In this experiment, the consistency method uses the
thresholds proposed in [25]. In practice, detection thresholds should be well tuned
when multiple methods are used to capture the different aspects of fake reviews.
3.6.4 Expert Reviews
In the experiment of previous subsection, there are 16 products detected by
ERO analysis. As we discussed in Section 3.6.1, no ground truth is available
for performance evaluation. Therefore, in order to evaluate the results of ERO
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analysis, we conduct expert reviews in this section.
The detection results are presented as one or two sentences and provided to
the expert reviewers as hints. The expert reviewers answer two questions – “do
you think the product contains fake reviews?” and “how confident do you feel when
you answer the first question?”. There are 16 expert reviewers participating in the
evaluation. When determine the results of expert review, we use majority votes.
Particularly, if 8 or more people vote the product as non-victim, then the detection
is considered as false alarm.
The results are shown in Table 13. According to the expert reviews, 6.3%
detected products are voted as false alarm. Particularly, 11.1% products detected
by ‘verified’ feature are voted as false alarm, and no products detected by ‘day of
week’ feature are voted as false alarm. It is noticed that, ‘day of week’ feature is
more convincing than ‘verified’ feature. We also investigate the confidence change.
The products are first provided to expert reviewers without any hints. After they
making their decisions, the hints are provided to them and they make their decision
again. For each decision, they choose one confidence level from the 5 levels. We
calculate the confidence change after they getting the hints, and the results are
shown in Table 13. There is an average 10.5% confidence increase, which means
people can feel more confident if they can consult the ERO analysis.
3.6.5 Discussion
When a smart attacker learns ERO principle and ERO analysis, the attacker
may be able to perform certain actions to avoid the detection of ERO analysis. For
example, there are some fake reviewers working on specific day, and this pattern
can be detected by ERO analysis with ‘day of week’ feature. However, a smart
attacker can change the attack strategy to avoid the detection of ERO analysis,
such as posting fake reviews randomly in a week. In this case, the ERO analysis
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is not attack resistance.
To our best knowledge, almost all the existing approaches cannot guarantee
attack resistance. However, the proposed ERO analysis can increase the cost of
attack and thus reduce the impact of fake reviews. For example, if the reviewers’
IP addresses are available for ERO analysis, then we are able to estimate the
reviewers’ geographic location information based on their IP addresses. The ERO
analysis is able to detect correlations between rating value and reviewers’ city or
state. Although it is still not attack resistance, as attackers can technically change
their IP addresses, the attack cost must be increased.
In practice, a more effective way to improve attack resistance is using multiple
detection methods to capture the diverse structures of fake reviews.
3.7 Conclusion
The ERO principle, which is a new angle to detect fake reviews, has been
introduced in this manuscript. The fraudulence signal detected by ERO analysis
is very different from the traditional approaches. Furthermore, it needs very limited
data to set up detection thresholds, and only requires the reviews for a particular
product in order to determine whether this product is under review manipulation.
Therefore, it can be performed in real-time. Experiments based on real data are
conducted. Several review features are examined for the applicability of ERO
analysis, and two of them are found applicable. The detection results are compared
with two common existing methods. The proposed ERO analysis provides a new
angle of fake review detection. We also conduct expert reviews to evaluate the
ERO analysis results, in which the ERO analysis gives a low false alarm rate. In
the future, we look forward to selecting more ERO features and implementing a
real application and involve more users for testing.
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